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The challenge of abstract concepts 
 
Abstract 
 
Abstract concepts (‘freedom’) differ from concrete ones (‘cat’), as they do not have a bounded, 
identifiable and clearly perceivable referent. The way in which abstract concepts are represented 
has recently become a topic of intense debate, especially because of the spread of the embodied 
approach to cognition. Within this framework concepts derive their meaning from the same 
perception, motor and emotional systems that are involved in online interaction with the world. 
Most of the evidence in favour of this view, however, has been gathered with regard to concrete 
concepts. Given the relevance of abstract concepts for higher-order cognition, we argue that being 
able to explain how they are represented is a crucial challenge that any theory of cognition needs to 
address. The aim of this article is to offer a critical review of the latest theories on abstract concepts, 
focusing on embodied ones. Starting with theories that question the distinction between abstract and 
concrete concepts, we review theories claiming that abstract concepts are grounded in metaphors, in 
situations and introspection, and in emotion. We then introduce multiple representation theories, 
according to which abstract concepts evoke both sensorimotor and linguistic information. We argue 
that the most promising approach is given by multiple representation views that combine an 
embodied perspective with the recognition of the importance of linguistic and social experience. 
We conclude by discussing whether or not a single theoretical framework might be able to explain 
all different varieties of abstract concepts.   
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The challenge of abstract concepts 
 
 
The challenge 
 
What do we talk about when we talk about “love”? There are many reasons why this question is 
difficult to answer. One important reason, though probably not one that makes for interesting 
literature, is that the word “love”, in common with concepts referring to commendable virtues such 
as “honesty” and “justice”, cannot be easily pinned down to concrete and easily identifiable 
referents. Indeed concrete concepts, such as “table” and “cat”, typically have single, bounded, 
identifiable referents that can be perceived with our senses –we can, for example, see and move a 
table, and we can see and caress a cat and hear it meowing. In contrast, abstract concepts such as 
“fantasy”, “freedom” and “justice”, lack bounded and clearly perceivable referents, even if they 
might evoke situations, scenes, introspection and emotional experiences. This makes it harder to 
understand what we are talking about when we talk about “love”, “fantasy”, “freedom” and 
“justice” than when we talk about “cats”. Furthermore, abstract concepts are more detached by 
sensorial experience: for example, a model based on five features related to sensorimotor 
experience (sound, color, visual motion, shape, and manipulation), was able to successfully predict 
brain patterns of concrete concepts, but not of abstract ones (Fernandino, Humphreys, Seidenberg, 
Gross, Conant, Binder, 2015).  
Concrete and abstract concepts do not represent a dychotomy, even if they differ. All concepts are 
highly dependent on context and are variable. However, abstract concepts are less stable over time 
and are more shaped by current life experiences, situations, and culture compared to concrete 
concepts (Barsalou, 1987). Moreover, abstract concepts are also by far the most variable: people 
agree more with one another when asked to define, produce associations, or generate characteristics 
for “chair” than for “truth” or “love”. Furthermore, most concrete concepts can be inscribed into the 
two broad categories of natural objects and artefacts (or living and non-living entities, such as 
“animals” and “furniture”). Abstract concepts come instead in a great variety, as the difference 
between “number”, “opinion” and “philosophy” suggests. 
 
The way in which abstract concepts are represented has been discussed in the literature for over 30 
years. However, it is now becoming a topic of intense debate in psychological science, due to the 
emergence of the embodied and grounded (from now on referred to as embodied) approaches to 
cognition.  
Embodied approaches consider human concepts to be influenced by the kind of body that organisms 
possess and are “grounded” in perception, action and emotion systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2012; 
Borghi, 2005; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). This means, for example,  that, according to the embodied 
view, the concept of “cat” and the word “cat” acquire meaning by the internal simulation or re-
enactment of the perceptual, motor and emotional experiences linked to seeing a cat, caressing it, or 
hearing it meowing (Barsalou, 2009; Gallese, 2008). This simulation consists of the reactivation of 
the neural patterns active when we experience a cat; this helps us to interact with novel cats as we 
encounter them, forming predictions about what they will do next.  
In the last 10-15 years researchers have collected a considerable amount of evidence in support of 
the embodied view. Even if the embodied approach has been recently under attack (e.g. Goldinger, 
Papesh, Barnhart, Hansen & Hout, 2015; Mahon, 2015; but see Barsalou, 2016, for a defence), 
many studies have demonstrated that concrete concepts (e.g. “bottle”, “cat”) do activate perceptual 
properties, actions and emotions. It is much more difficult to provide compelling demonstrations 
that abstract concepts such as “freedom” and “justice” are embodied, as they do not have a clearly 
identifiable referent. Many proponents of embodied theories have acknowledged this difficulty. 
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Unfortunately, this weakness has led others to suggest that embodied views cannot, in the end, 
explain the formation, use and representation of abstract concepts (e.g., Dove, 2009).  
In this paper we argue that abstract concepts pose a challenge that can no longer be postponed. The 
challenge arises in demonstrating that not only concrete but also abstract concepts can be explained 
by adopting an extended embodied perspective: even if abstract concepts lack a bounded, 
identifiable and perceivable referent, they are grounded. We will contend that, beyond sensorimotor 
and emotional experience, language and sociality play a crucial role in grounding them. 
Since distributional theories of meaning can easily explain how abstract concepts are represented 
(Andrews et al., 2014), it could be argued that abstract concepts constitute a problem only for the 
embodied approach. According to distributional or statistical approaches (e.g., Lund & Burgess, 
1996, HAL; Landauer & Dumais, 1997, LSA), meaning is computed statistically. Meaning is given 
by the co-occurrence of words in large masses (corpora) and it derives from the relationship 
between associated words rather than between words and their referents (for a recent overview, see 
Andrews et al., 2014; see also work by Max Louwerse: e.g., Louwerse & Jeauniaux, 2010). Thus, 
the meaning of both concrete and abstract words is derived from their statistical distribution in large 
corpora. Since all meaning is captured by associations between words, distributional theories do not 
need to posit any difference between concrete and abstract words. 
However, the explanation offered by distributional theories of both concrete and abstract concepts 
representation is incomplete, since they are unable to solve the “symbol grounding problem” 
(Harnad, 1990): to be understood and avoid circularity, symbols ultimately need to be grounded in 
their world referents. (Even if very powerful, notice however that Harnad’s argument is not 
universally accepted). As soon as one recognizes that abstract concepts need to be grounded but do 
not have a bounded and perceivable referent, the challenge arises. In the review, we will argue that 
recent literature converges in showing that, in order to explain grounding of abstract concepts, the 
embodied perspective must be extended to take into account the important role of linguistic and 
social experience, and that the study of conceptual acquisition can widely contribute to account for 
abstract concepts representation.   
More generally, the challenge to explain abstract concepts representation is crucial for a simple but 
pivotal reason: the ability to use abstract thought represents one of the most sophisticated abilities 
of our species. We are not arguing that other animals lack the capacity to represent at least some 
“abstract” concepts: for example, non-human animals are able to group stimuli together according 
to whether they “differ” or  are “equal” (e.g. Flemming, 2012). Our point is that humans possess 
such a capacity at a qualitative and quantitative different level than non-human animals (Lupyan & 
Bergen, 2016). Any theory of higher-order cognition would be incomplete if it was unable to 
explain how we make use of abstract concepts.  
In sum: providing an explanation of abstract concepts representation is crucial to further the 
understanding of higher-order human cognition. Importantly, such a challenge concerns not only a 
subset of theories, i.e. the embodied ones, since non-embodied theories also fail to provide a 
thorough explanation of concepts that addresses the symbol grounding problem.  
In what follows we will present the current debate on abstract concepts representation (for recent 
reviews, see Borghi and Binkofski, 2014; Reilly, Peelle, Garcia, & Crutch, 2016; Pecher et al., 
2011). We will focus, in particular, on the most recent embodied theories on abstract concepts, 
critically evaluating recent evidence supporting them, and discussing their strengths and their 
limitations. We will concentrate on embodied theories also because the majority of the behavioral 
studies on abstract concepts of the last years derive from the embodied cognition approach, or 
address embodied approaches. While thisreview focuses on abstract concepts, we will also discuss 
theories and evidence on the representation of abstract words. We do not intend to equate concepts 
and words: language influences categorization, it augments it, rendering word meaning more 
compact and discrete than concepts (Lupyan, 2012; Mirolli & Parisi, 2011). Where possible, we 
will distinguish between concepts and word meanings and focus on concepts; in most of the cases, 
however, it is impossible, because tasks on conceptual representation in human adults usually 
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involve the use of words. In such cases we will not distinguish between “abstract concepts” and 
“abstract word meanings”.  
Since the literature on abstract concepts is heterogeneous, this review does not aim to be exhaustive. 
Specifically, we will not treat neuropsychological and brain imaging evidence in detail, unless the 
results of a study are crucial to test or support a specific proposal under review (for a recent review 
on insights from neuropsychology on abstract concepts, see Hoffman, 2015). Moreover, even if 
numbers and emotions represent important domains of abstract conceptualization, we will not 
consider theories that focus only on numerical cognition or only on the conceptualization of 
emotions, as these theories are beyond the scope of this work. We will refer to emotion and number 
concepts only when dealing with studies on wide samples of abstract concepts that include, among 
others, emotional and numerical concepts. As to the theories we have selected, while we will only 
briefly overview classical theories on abstract concepts, we have decided to describe the embodied 
theories proposed from 2004 to 2015-6, illustrating if possible both supporting and contradictory 
evidence. For very influential theories, as the Conceptual Metaphor theory, we will not review all 
the available evidence, as this would require a dedicated review. Instead, we have chosen to refer to 
some very influential studies, as well as to reviews of studies, when they are available.  
In the review we will show that an important novelty of the literature of the last years is the 
emergence of approaches based on multiple strategies. In particular, it is becoming evident that in 
order to explain abstract concepts a standard embodied approach must be integrated with a 
perspective that emphasizes the importance of language for concepts. In the course of the review we 
will thus often refer to language and linguistic information. Linguistic information means different 
things in different theories. First, it can mean information that is conveyed solely through language 
without direct reference to the world (e.g., by pointing, gesture, or use of deictic terms). We will 
refer to this meaning as "linguistically conveyed information." Note that linguistically conveyed 
information might be embodied in its representation, that is, make use of sensorimotor and 
emotional systems. Second, linguistic information could refer to the literal words themselves and 
their representations. For example, a word can be a sequence of sounds or a sequence of visual 
forms. We will refer to this concept as "linguistic form information." Note that linguistic form 
information may very well be embodied. That is, the sounds may be represented in the auditory 
system and the visual forms in the visual system. Some theories, however, propose that linguistic 
form information is amodal, and so we will also use the terms "amodal linguistic form information" 
and "modal linguistic form information." Third, linguistic information might refer to notions other 
than words, such as syntactic relations. We will refer to this idea as "syntactic linguistic 
information".  
The emphasis on language has long been one of the strong points of distributional theories. In our 
view, the most promising approaches take inspiration from distributional views in highlighting the 
role of language for abstract concepts. At the same time, they differ from distributional views as 
they do not focus simply on word associations, but consider language as a holistic experience, in its 
bodily and social aspects. From our birth – and even earlier (Moon, Lagercrantz, & Kuhl, 2013; 
Voulumanos & Werker, 2007) - we are immersed in a linguistic environment. Language has been 
defined as a mode of participation in the world (see Irwin, 2015, for developing this aspect in 
relation to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty). Language, which is primarily a social experience, can 
become internalized and support our thought processes: speaking to ourselves helps us to better 
memorize and plan our actions (Vygotsky, 1986; Clark, 1998; Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015). 
Recent proposals have shown that language is not only a communication system, but a control 
system  that programs human mind manipulating sensorimotor experiences (Lupyan & Bergen, 
2016). Language directed at others and inner speech provide an important means of building 
predictions: for example, listening to a word can help our visual system to process noisy inputs 
(Lupyan & Clark, 2015). Language also involves a bodily experience: we produce sounds, we listen 
to them, and it is possible that when we think of abstract words we internally reproduce their sound, 
re-enacting the experience of their acquisition, and explaining to ourself their meaning, formulating 
 5 
predictions against which sensory experiences can be assessed. Importantly, it is highly plausible 
that the contribution of language to thought processes is particularly crucial for abstract concepts 
and for the corresponding words, given their lack of bounded and perceivable referents.  
Our aim is to convince the reader that the debate on abstract concepts is not internal to embodied 
theories, but rather that it also involves distributional theories of meaning, and that the most 
exciting directions of research are emerging by bridging the strong points of these two approaches, 
i.e. the importance of grounding abstract concepts in perception, action and emotion systems and 
the crucial role of language in this process. However, we will also contend that integrating 
embodied and distributional theories is not sufficient to account for abstract concepts for at least 
three reasons. The first is that these approaches do not emphasize the role of language as a tool to 
improve thinking (e.g. Clark, 1998; Dove, 2015; Lupyan & Bergen, 2016; Vygotsky, 1986). The 
second, more crucial reason, it that, focusing on the combinatorial aspects of language, these 
approaches completely overlook the crucial role of the social dimension for language. The third is 
that they do not highlight the importance of the modality of acquisition of language, and in 
particular the pivotal role of social competences for word learning. In our view only new views and 
research directions that highlight these three aspects - i.e. that conceive language as a prediction and 
thought instrument, that emphasize the social dimension for concepts and language, and that take 
profound inspiration and insights from studies on language acquisition - will be able to meet the 
challenge to explain abstract concepts.  
 
 
Classical theories of abstract concepts 
 
A tale of two classical theories: CAT vs DCT 
Concrete words have an advantage over abstract words: they are processed faster and more 
accurately in a variety of tasks, such as lexical decision (i.e deciding whether a word exists or not), 
naming and recall. During the 80’s and 90’s, two classical theories on abstract concepts proposed 
different explanations of this “concreteness effect”. These are the Context Availability Theory and 
the Dual Coding Theory. 
According to the Context Availability Theory (CAT) (e.g., Schwanenflugel et al., 1988; 1992), 
concrete concepts are strongly associated to a reduced number of contexts, while abstract concepts 
are weakly associated to a much wider range and number of contexts (Schwanenflugel et al., 1988). 
Therefore, the Context Availability Theory explains the better recall of concrete than abstract 
concepts arguing that processing abstract words is slower because activating their context requires 
more effort.  
An alternative theory, which has become far more influential, is the Dual Coding Theory (DCT) 
(e.g., Paivio, 1986; Paivio et al., 1968). This theory explains the concreteness effect with the higher 
imageability of concrete compared to abstract concepts. According to Dual Coding Theory, all 
concepts are represented through the verbal system, but only concrete concepts have a direct 
connection with images. For instance, the abstract concept of “religion” evokes images only 
through the mediation of concrete concepts such as “church”.  
The Dual Coding Theory posits a negative relationship between abstractness and imageability: the 
more abstract a concept is, the less imageable it is. However, this intuitive relationship is 
problematic since, as was recently highlighted (Kousta et al., 2011), the two dimensions are 
correlated but not equivalent. An additional area of contention, shared by both Context Availability 
Theory and Dual Coding Theory, is the weak evidence-base for the ‘concreteness effect’. While 
some research did not find this effect (Barca et al., 2012), controlling for word valence some studies  
found an opposite ‘abstractness effect’, i.e. a processing advantage of abstract over concrete 
concepts, (Kousta et al., 2011). Other studies replicated the abstractness effect in response times but 
found a reverse concreteness effect in event related potentials (ERPs) (Barber et al., 2013): abstract 
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words were processed faster than concrete ones, but concrete ones elicited larger N400 and N700 
ERPs, typically associated with processing meaningful stimuli and with imagery.  
Beside the concreteness effect, results of recent studies are also inconsistent with both Context 
Availability Theory and Dual Coding Theory. Connell and Lynott (2012), for instance, asked 
participants to rate concepts not only in terms of concreteness and imageability, but also in terms of 
auditory, gustatory, haptic, olfactory, and visual strength (see also Moffat et al., 2015). In contrast 
to Context Availability Theory, they found that concepts characterized by higher perceptual 
strength, which CAT would categorise as concrete, evoke a higher number of contexts compared to 
concepts with low perceptual strength. This study also strongly contradicts the Dual Coding Theory. 
The results showed that imageability is not strongly correlated with perceptual experience, since it 
seems to reflect more the ease with which an image is generated, rather than whether a concept is 
abstract or concrete. In addition, imageability ratings appeared to be visually biased, while 
perceptual strength was able to predict the results of lexical decision and naming tasks better than 
contextual availability and imageability.  
Furthermore, there is conflicting evidence regarding the neural underpinnings of concrete and 
abstract words, which has led to much debate in the literature. For example, some brain imaging 
research supports the Dual Coding Theory, showing that processing concrete words led to more 
bilateral activation than processing abstract words (e.g. Binder et al. , 2005; Sabsevitz et al., 2005), 
which are more left-lateralized (e.g., Binder et al., 2005; Fiebach & Friederici, 2004), while other 
studies contradict this research as they found evidence for an opposite neural pattern (Pexman et al., 
2007; Kiehl et al., 1999).  
It is important to note that inconsistencies in this research area (e.g. concreteness vs. abstractness 
effect, left- vs. right lateralization in the brain; for a review see Borghi & Binkofski, 2014, chapter 
5) could be due to methological differences between studies, which  have often used different 
methods to select stimuli. For example, some studies selected abstract words on the basis of the 
imageability ratings, others based their selection on abstractness/concreteness ratings, while other 
studies selected abstract words on the basis of intuition of researchers. It is possible, therefore, that 
comparability of findings has been reduced by these inconsistences in the selection of stimuli. It is 
clear from the evidence mentioned above that future research needs to develop validated criteria for 
the selection of abstract concepts, which should then be implemented universally. In the final 
section of the review we will briefly illustrate promising recent directions trying to investigate 
different sub-types of abstract concepts, and at the same time to propose more general criteria to use 
for stimuli selection.  
 
Embodied and grounded theories of abstract concepts 
 
As suggested above, the issue of how abstract concepts are represented has been focus of intense 
debate over the last decade, mainly due to the increasing diffusion of embodied theories of 
cognition (Barsalou, 2008; Borghi & Caruana, 2015; Wilson, 2002). Our review will now focus on 
contributions adopting this perspective and addressing the problem of abstract concepts 
representations. We will cover the main current proposals and evaluate the supporting evidence, 
while highlighting their strengths and limitations (see Table 1).  
 
------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Within embodied theory, scholars are still divided into two schools of thought: one group focuses 
on the similarities between concrete and abstract concepts, while the other group emphasizes their 
differences. The latter either argues for a sharp distinction between concrete and abstract concepts, 
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or views them on a continuum which spans from less abstract to very abstract concepts (Wiemer-
Hastings et al., 2001; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005).  
One influential view which posits that abstract and concrete concepts are profoundly different 
comes from neuropsychology. We will describe it before starting to illustrate the embodied theories, 
because it cannot be considered an example of an embodied approach. According to this view, 
concrete and abstract concepts are characterized by qualitatively and structurally different 
information (Crutch & Warrington 2005; 2007; 2010): while concrete concepts mainly rely on 
categorical similarity relations (e.g. “theft-burglary”), abstract concepts primarily rely on semantic 
associations (e.g. “theft-punishment”). This distinction is derived from single-case studies on 
double dissociations: patients with semantic refractory access dysphasia showed greater 
interference for abstract words organized by associative relations, while the opposite pattern was 
found with concrete words. This distinction has also been found in healthy participants (see e.g. 
Crutch, Connell & Warrington, 2009). Dunabeitia et al. (2011) provided evidence that healthy 
individuals tend to fixate more and earlier on pictures associated with abstract words than with 
concrete words (e.g. “nose-smell” compared to “baby-crib”). Hence associative relations are seen to 
be more important for abstract concepts than for concrete ones. However, the evidence obtained 
both with clinical and with general populations is controversial. Failure to replicate the results of 
Crutch and Warrington (2005) with aphasic patients has challenged the hypothesis that abstract and 
concrete words differ in terms of the conceptual relations they evoke (e.g., Hamilton & Coslett, 
2008; Hamilton & Martin, 2010). Furthermore, some behavioral results contradicted the findings of  
Dunabeitia et al. (2011). Geng and Schnur (2015) asked Chinese-English bilinguals to match a 
Chinese auditory-presented word with one among several other visually-presented English words. 
This study found that related words are processed faster than unrelated words, but categorical 
relations (e.g. “idea-attitude”) always led to a better performance compared to associative relations 
(e.g. “math-examination”). In a recent study with a semantic priming paradigm both within and 
across languages, a priming effect was observed for concrete words for both semantically similar 
and associative relations. For abstract words, instead, it was present only when prime and target 
words were associated (Ferré, Guasch, García-Chico, & Sánchez-Casas, 2015).  
 From these results, it could be concluded either that abstract and concrete concepts appear to be 
represented similarly both in terms of categorical and associative relations (see also Marques and 
Nunes 2012, Zhang, Han, & Bi, 2013, for a similar conclusion), or that associative relations are 
more relevant to characterize abstract concepts, but that for the representation of concrete ones both 
categorical and associative relations are relevant (Ferré et al., 2015) 
 
Although evidence for the existence of a ‘marked distinction’ is conflicting, there is a compelling 
reason for these inconsistent results. Crutch and Jackson (2011) recently suggested that the 
relationship between concreteness and categorical and semantic associations is not binary but rather 
graded. Therefore the range of results in the literature may actually provide evidence that these 
associations are on a continuum. Drawing on this conclusion, in what follows we will concentrate 
on embodied cognition studies adopting the idea of a continuum spanning from concrete to abstract 
items. The idea of a continuum is that most widely accepted by most researchers. The idea of a 
continuum presents a further important insight: that no real dichotomy exists between concrete and 
abstract concepts, since even concepts that are generally qualified as concrete have an abstract 
component and vice versa. Consider the concept of “cent” or “euro”: It is mostly a concrete one 
since its referent has specific perceptual characteristics, as a given size, color, weight, but at the 
same time it has an exchange value that cannot be easily pinned down to the concrete aspects of its 
referent (see Guan et al., 2013).  
 
Strong embodiment: Concrete and abstract concepts do not differ 
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According to some embodied theories, concrete and abstract concepts do not differ substantially 
because they are both grounded in the same systems engaged during perception, action and emotion 
(e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Connell & Lynott, 2012; Glenberg et al., 2008a, 2008b). The advocates 
of this perspective seek to demonstrate that the arousal of perceptual states, actions, and emotions is 
not solely limited to concrete concepts, but is also possible for abstract concepts. Embodied theories 
which support this perspective are based on evidence on the Action-sentence Compatibility Effect 
(ACE, Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), on the approach-avoidance effect (Chen & Bargh, 1999), and 
on force dynamics (Talmy, 1988).  
The ACE shows that, when a sentence implies action in one direction (e.g. the sentence “give the 
cards to somebody” implies action away from the body), the participants are slower in judging 
whether the sentence makes sense or not if they are required to respond performing a movement in 
the opposite direction. This effect is equally present for both concrete and abstract transfer 
sentences (e.g., “give the cards” and “give the responsibility”). This behavioural evidence has been 
taken to suggest that the same action schema underlies representation of both concrete and abstract 
information (Glenberg et al., 2008a, 2008b).  
Neuro-cognitive studies using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) complement these 
behavioral findings, as they have observed higher Motor Evoked Potentials for transfer sentences 
than for non-transfer ones. The absence of a difference between sentences related to transfer of 
objects (concrete) and of information (abstract) indicates that in both cases the motor system is 
activated (Glenberg et al., 2008a). ACE effects also apply to sentences involving time shifts (Sell & 
Kaschak, 2011): responses away from the body were faster with sentences involving the future, 
while responses towards the body were faster with sentences involving past events.  
Further evidence supporting the view that concrete and abstract concepts do not differ substantially 
is provided by the approach-avoidance effect. This effect states that positive words (e.g. “gold”, 
“sunshine”) evoke an attraction movement, while negative words (e.g. “garbage”, “virus”) evoke a 
rejection movement, regardless of whether they are abstract or concrete (Chen & Bargh, 1999).  
Studies of cognitive linguistics on force dynamics also provide converging evidence with these 
results. According to Talmy (1988), events, be they physical, psychological, or social, can be 
viewed as oppositions between conflicting forces, for example, between an agonist and an 
antagonist force (e.g. “The ball kept on rolling along the green”; “John can’t go out of the house”; 
“She’s got to go to the park”). Force dynamics states that abstract and concrete events rely on the 
same force mechanisms. In line with this view, research using a sentence sensibility task has shown 
that primes given by two shapes interacting following the same force dynamics pattern, evoked 
faster responses than two shapes that did not follow the same pattern (Madden and Pecher, 2010, 
reported in Pecher et al., 2011). As predicted by Talmy (1988), the results were the same with 
concrete and abstract sentences. 
 
Strengths and limitations.  
To sum up, the evidence discussed so far is based on sound and compelling results, obtained both 
through behavioral and TMS studies. However, these results can be used to claim either that 
abstract concepts are grounded in similar systems as concrete ones, or, more strongly, that abstract 
and concrete concepts do not differ at all. Both of these interpretations will now be discussed. 
 
Abstract concepts are grounded in the same processes of concrete concepts 
Previous evidence indicates that abstract concepts activate perception and action systems as 
concrete concepts. Even if these findings are broadly consistent with an embodied approach to 
abstract concepts, it is difficult to foresee whether this strategy can be extended to account for all 
abstract concepts. For example, ACE has been found with concrete and abstract transfer sentences, 
e.g. sentences referring to exchange of objects vs. of information, with sentences referring to past 
and future events (Sell & Kaschak, 2011), and also with sentences referring to increasing or 
decreasing quantities (e.g. Guan et al., 2013). Yet, it is difficult to think that it can apply to all 
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domains in which abstract concepts exist: for example, how can it account for concepts as 
“philosophy”, “thought” or “freedom”? Similarly, current research suggests that Approach 
Avoidance-Effect can be found with a variety of words (e.g. Förster & Strack, 2006;Freina et al., 
2009; Eder & Hommel, 2013; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Seibt et al., 2008; van Danzig et al., 2008; 
for a recent meta-analysis on approach avoidance and affective stimuli in response times tasks, see 
Phaf et al., 2014). Both lines of research are, however, limited to words or stimuli characterized by 
a positive or negative valence, or to novel words designed in such a way that the same kinematics 
used during deglution or expectoration (inward vs. outward movement) are reproduced in order to 
pronounce them (Topolinski et al., 2014). Moreover, even if the theory of force dynamics requires 
further experimental support, it is difficult to imagine that evidence based on force dynamics can be 
extended beyond the domain of events: for example, how can it explain concepts as “linguistics” or 
numerical concepts as “four”? Finally, similar results do not necessarily imply similar processes. 
An example is given by a recent study by Yao, Vasiljevic, Weick, Sereno, O’Donnell, and Sereno 
(2013). The authors found a size effect in word recognition: big words (e.g., jungle) were processed 
faster than small ones (e.g. needle), independently of concreteness level of words. However, the 
explanation of the effect might differ for concrete and abstract concepts. While the explanation is 
more intuitive for concrete concepts, it is possible that big abstract concepts (e.g., disaster) include 
a wider range of introspective, social, and situational associations compared to smaller concepts. 
Indeed, regression analyses revealed that subjective ratings of emotional arousal were the only 
significant predictor of size, and that arousal had a more crucial effect in the recognition of abstract 
than of concrete words. This is an example of a study in which apparently results do not differ 
between abstract and concrete concepts, but the processes they imply differ substantially.  
 
Concrete and abstract concepts do not differ.  
This second claim is not, in our view, justifiable by the available evidence. Firstly, it is statistically 
unsound to infer that two concepts (e.g. abstract and concrete) can be equated with one another, 
simply from the absence of differences in performance. Secondly, people tend to evaluate and use 
concrete and abstract concepts differently - for example, they rate “justice” as more abstract than 
“bottle” – and this difference should be explained. Third, an increasing number of behavioral, 
neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that these two kinds of concepts 
are differently processed and recalled. To make an example, in a recent study Binder, Conant, 
Humphreys, Fernandino, Simons, Aguilar and Desai (2016) designed a componential model of 
concepts based on functional divisions in the human brain. To this aim they used a large set of 
attributes related to different experiences and found that 57 of the 65 attributes distinguished 
abstract from concrete categories. More specifically, abstract concepts received higher ratings than 
concrete ones on attributes related to temporal and causal experiences, social experiences, and 
emotional experiences, while they received lower ratings in sensorial experiences. For all these 
reasons, we suggest that a systematic theory of abstract concepts should not only assume that 
differences between concrete and abstract concepts exist, but also be able to explain why these 
differences occur.  
Recently there has been an interesting variation to the view that abstract and concrete concepts are 
similar. Guan et al. (2013) used EEG and found ACE effects with both concrete and abstract 
concepts (for a further ERPs study see D’Angiulli et al., 2015). The authors explained their results 
by arguing that both concrete and abstract words activate the motor system. However, while 
concrete concepts are grounded in specific sensorimotor simulations, as they re-enact previous 
experiences with the category members, abstract concepts are mainly grounded in the process of 
prediction. Examples introduced by the authors provide weight to this argument: the concept of 
“banana” activates the simulation of eating it, which may involve seeing its shape and color, peeling 
it, and tasting it (vision, action, taste). Even if it is mainly concrete, the concept of “banana” has an 
abstract component as well, consisting of the prediction that eating it will reduce hunger. On the 
opposite site of the coin, an abstract concept such as “democracy” involves some concrete 
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components (e.g. the simulation of voting), but most of its meaning derives from abstract 
components linked to predictions of what follows from a process being democratic (e.g. concern for 
human rights, higher tolerance). Importantly, both kinds of components are grounded upon and 
refer to different characteristics and mechanisms of the motor system. 
Compared to other views, this proposal has the advantage of suggesting a mechanism underlying 
abstract concepts that is supported by a functional architecture of brain organization: the role of 
forward models within the motor system, whose function is to anticipate the sensory consequences 
of actions (Wolpert et al., 2003; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012). The contribution of this theory thus 
consists in specifying the fine-grained mechanisms that underlie the involvement of the motor 
system in conceptual grounding. Even if the theoretical framework is clearly outlined, the extent to 
which predictions derived from this view differ from those stemming from the view according to 
which abstract concepts, similarly to concrete ones, are represented simply in terms of their content, 
and are grounded in the motor system is not fully clear. Furthermore, even if, as argued by Guan et 
al. (2013), many abstract names are “names for processes” (e.g. democracy relies, among other 
processes, on the processes of counting and voting), this view is likely to be insufficiently general 
to be applied to all varieties of abstract concepts.  
 
Concrete and abstract concepts are different 
 
Taken together the evidence discussed so far does not support the view that there are no differences 
between concrete and abstract concepts. Therefore, in what follows we will concentrate on the most 
recent theories that provide evidence of differences between abstract and concrete concepts, and 
discuss and evaluate the mechanisms and cognitive components that might be responsible for such 
differences.  
 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). 
Since the 80's, Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), which is probably the most influential 
embodied theory on abstract concepts, has proposed that abstract and concrete concepts are indeed 
different (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). The Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory is primarily based on observations of language use. This theory posits that when talking 
about abstract concepts people tend to use metaphors derived from concrete domains: for example, 
we say that “life is a journey”. According to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, metaphors concern 
not only the way in which we use language, but also the way in which we think of the world. Even 
if, for the most part, the supporting evidence is derived from linguistics, the Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory has benefited from empirical evidence obtained without linguistic stimuli, mainly deriving 
from behavioral studies (for reviews, see Gibbs, 1994; 2006; for examples of very recent work e.g., 
Casasanto & Bottini, 2014; Jamrozik, McQuire, Cardillo, & Chatterjee, 2016; Sato et al., 2015; 
Zhao, He & Zhang, 2016). Researchers favoring the Conceptual Metaphor Theory argue that 
abstract concepts are understood by placing them in concrete knowledge domains, and that this 
mapping guarantees their grounding. Important abstract concepts are understood through multiple 
conceptual metaphors: for example, the abstract concept of “communication” can be understood as 
sending ideas from one container (head) to another, as well as feeding someone with thoughts 
(Lakoff, 2014). Recent behavioral evidence supporting this view shows that, for example, the 
abstract notion of “category” is understood with reference to the concrete concept of “container” 
(Boot & Pecher, 2011), the concept of “similarity” relies on that of “closeness” (Boot & Pecher, 
2010), the notions of “good” and “bad” are associated to the right and left space (for a recent study 
showing that this effect is modulated by mental imagery, see de la Fuente, Casasanto, Martine-
Cascales, & Santiago, 2016), and “power” is comprehended by referring to the vertical dimension 
(Zanolie et al., 2012; Lakens, Semin & Foroni, 2015), similarly to morality (Wang, Lu & Lu, 2016). 
Furthermore, we use abstract language to characterize phenomena that we consider to be more 
distant from us: for example, recent data from Twitter indicate that more abstract language is used 
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when referring to distant cities, to distant past or future time points, and to people who are socially 
distant from us (Snefjella & Kuperman, 2015). 
Possibly, the concept which has been most extensively studied is the concept of “time”: the 
underlying rationale is that, since “time” is an abstract concept, it can be understood by mapping it 
on the more concrete concept of “space” (e.g., Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008; see Flusberg et al., 2010, for a connectionist model). Imagine presenting 
participants with an ambiguous question: “Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two 
days. What day is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled? “Answering “Monday” implies 
adopting an ego-moving perspective, while answering “Friday” a time-moving perspective: in the 
first case forward is in the direction of motion of the observer, in the second case forward is in the 
direction of motion of time. Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) have shown that people, who are at the 
beginning of a train journey, of a lunch line, or people who had just flown in, tend to respond using 
an ego-moving perspective, whereas when they are at the end of a trip, or of a line, they use a time 
moving perspective. This result indicates that space and time are strictly interwoven. The 
perspective adopted varies depending on the spoken language. Asking the ‘same’ ambiguous 
question to Mandarin Chinese and English speakers Lai and Boroditsky (2013) have found that 
while English speakers tend to adopt an ego moving perspective and Mandarin Chinese 
monolinguals a time moving one, bilinguals shift between the two perspectives.  
The proposition that we use the concrete concept of space to reason and understand the abstract 
concept of time seems to be confirmed by the observation that in language use the relationship 
between space and time is asymmetrical: we tend to speak about time in terms of space more often 
than we speak about space in terms of time. Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008) have demonstrated 
the asymmetrical relationship between space and time, showing that distance affects duration, but 
duration does not influence distance.  
That space and time are strictly related has been further supported by a variety of cross-cultural 
studies. Depending on the culture, time metaphors can refer to quantity or to distance: for example, 
in English people typically say “a long meeting”, in Greek “a large meeting”. Consistent with the 
metaphors used, English-speakers estimates of time are more influenced by length than by quantity, 
while for Greek speakers the opposite is true (Casasanto, 2008).  
The way in which we think of the temporal flow, from the past to the future, is influenced by 
culture as well as by the characteristics of our own body (e.g. Bergen & Lau, 2012). For example,  
for English speakers time is conceptualized in terms of the front-back dimension (the past is behind 
us, the future is ahead of us), while the frequent use of vertical metaphors in Chinese has led 
Chinese Mandarin speakers also to conceive time in terms of the vertical dimension: the past is up, 
the future is down. This difference influences responses to implicit tasks, such as priming tasks. 
Boroditsky (2001) found that Chinese Mandarin speakers were faster to confirm that March comes 
earlier than April after being exposed to a prime where pairs of objects were vertically displayed 
(e.g. a black and white worm-ball). In contrast, English native-language speakers were faster when 
they were shown the same two objects disposed horizontally, and bilinguals had an intermediate 
performance. Though this study has been seen as very influential by advocates of embodied 
cognition, a failure to replicate these findings has also led to skepticism (see Chen, 2007). 
A recent study challenged the assumption made by the Conceptual Metaphor Theory that there is 
only an unidirectional influence from sensorimotor experience to metaphors (Slepian & Ambady, 
2014). If participants had been exposed to the metaphor that the past is heavy, they tended to 
estimate old books as heavier, whereas if they had been exposed to the metaphor that the present is 
heavy, they perceived new books as heavier. Thus, novel metaphors can influence sensorimotor 
processes, which suggests that the influence between metaphors and sensorimotor states is 
bidirectional.  
It should be noted that time is related not only to space, but also to number, and that number is 
related to space, as evidenced by a growing body of research (for a review, see Winter et al., 2015; 
see also Jones, 2015). Lakoff and Nunez (2000) have demonstrated that to speak about numbers, 
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people tend to use spatial metaphors: for example, they use the metaphor of numbers as a point on a 
line, or metaphor of arithmetic as motion along a path (Nunez & Marghetis, 2014). The close 
interaction between space, time and number is also revealed by the similarities between the Spatial 
Numerical Association of Response Codes, or SNARC effect (Dehaene, Bossini et al., 1993), and 
the Spatial Temporal Association of Response Codes, or STEARC effect (e.g. Ishihara et al., 2008, 
Santiago et al., 2007; Torralbo et al., 2006).  
The SNARC effect reveals that people in Western societies associate small numbers with the left 
and large numbers with the right, as well as subtraction to the left and addition to the right (see also 
Lugli et al., 2013; Anelli et al., 2014). The STEARC effect shows that people tend to associate the 
future to the right and the past to the left. Recent evidence shows however that English-speaking 
people systematically combine future-in-front and future-to-right metaphors while gesturing, 
suggesting that the conceptual representation of time involves the activation of multiple metaphors 
rather than the selection of one single metaphor (Walker & Cooperrider, 2016). However, time does 
not always flow from left to right because the writing direction influences people’s temporal 
concepts. For example, Spanish people are faster in responding with the right to words referring to 
the future and with the left with words referring to the past, but the opposite is true for Hebrew 
speakers (Santiago et al., 2007; Flumini & Santiago, 2012;  Ouellet et al., 2010; see also Fuhrmann 
& Boroditsky, 2011). 
The relationships between concepts of space, time and number has been at the center of  important 
recent debates (e.g. Lynott & Coventry, 2014; Santiago & Lakens, 2015; Winter et al., 2015). Two 
contrasting proposals highlighting the strict link between space, time and numbers have been 
advanced, the Theory of Magnitude (ATOM) and the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) views.  
The ATOM view is a general theory of magnitude that predicts interactions between all domains 
involving magnitudes, while CMT predicts interactions between space-number and space-time, but 
not necessarily between number and time. Furthermore, CMT posits that space representations are 
used asymmetrically to represent number and time, while no such asymmetry is assumed by the 
ATOM view. These two views have always been considered to be contrasting views, likely due to 
the different disciplines in which they developed (ATOM in neuroscience, CMT in linguistics and 
psychology) and to their differing focus. However, it is possible that they can be bridged: according 
to Winter et al. (2015), ATOM is better at explaining low level associations that are independent 
from language, while CMT is more precise in accounting for higher level associations mediated by 
language. This suggestion should be investigated further, as it would have interesting implications 
for our understanding of abstract and concrete concepts. 
 
Strengths and limitations.  
In comparison to other theories, the Conceptual Metaphor Theory has a number of advantages that 
have contributed to its standing as the most influential embodied theory on abstract concepts. Its 
most important strength is that it proposes a mechanism underlying the formation and use of 
abstract concepts, rather than arguing that a specific content characterizes them. However, the scope 
of such a mechanism is limited to specific conceptual domains. Using concrete-abstract mappings 
to understand the meaning of abstract concepts is possible only if there are adequate domains to be 
mapped in the first place. For example, one could question the adequacy of the space-time mapping. 
The very abstract idea of a general spatial container for all objects is neither simple nor direct, and it 
is debatable whether it can be considered as concrete.  
Furthermore, it is unclear whether it is always possible to find concrete domains corresponding to 
abstract ones. For example, it is difficult to think of concrete domains suitable for mapping abstract 
concepts such as “philosophy” or “linguistics” (for a similar critique, see Dove, 2009; Goldman and 
De Vignemont 2009). Furthermore, it should be better clarified whether the mapping always 
succeeds, and how it occurs. Consider metaphors such as “a sea of stars”: one crucial aspect of the 
sea is that it is liquid, but this aspect is not relevant for the mapped domain. Similarly, which 
aspects of the notion of “journey” would be used to conceptualize “life”, or why is the notion of 
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“power” conceptualized only in terms of hierarchical structure/verticality? In addition, metaphors 
help to detect similarities between concepts, but not their differences: life after all is not really a 
journey. How do we represent what of life is not a journey? And how about the fact that, while time 
flies, space does not (see e.g. Galton, 2011, for such a critique)?  
In sum, even if conceptual metaphors can play a role in the representation of abstract concepts, it is 
not necessarily so: many abstract conceptualizations do not seem to rely on concrete domains; 
furthermore, metaphorical mapping is likely to contribute to the understanding of abstract concepts, 
but it hardly exhausts their meaning, since metaphors cannot substitute direct experience (Barsalou 
and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). For example, neuronal regions dedicated to time processing, and not 
only to space, should be activated during comprehension of time concepts (Kranjec and Chatterijee, 
2010). These questions remain unanswered, and cast doubts on the generalizability of the 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory.  
Another important limitation of this view (see Dove 2009, for such a critique) concerns conceptual 
development: children start to use metaphors rather late, and their comprehension of metaphors 
remains quite poor until 8-10 years of age (Winner et al. 1976), while around 10% of the words 
used by 2 years-olds are abstract ones. How can this developmental trajectory be reconciled with 
the idea that we use metaphors to understand abstract concepts (Murphy, 1996; 1997)?  
Finally, while an increasing body of linguistic and behavioral evidence supports the Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory, neural evidence is still lacking. For example, it is unclear how the Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory could explain the results of brain imaging studies showing that differences exist 
between metaphorical and abstract concepts (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Boulenger et al., 2009; 
Boulenger et al., 2012; Desai et al., 2011; Rüschemeyer et al., 2007). Furthermore, recent evidence 
argues against a strong metaphoric account. Bardolph and Coulson (2015) recently recorded EEG 
as participants moved marbles either upwards or downwards while reading words with literal or 
metaphorical spatial associations (e.g., “ascend”, “descend” vs. “inspire”, “defeat”). They found 
early (200-300 ms after word onset) positive ERPs for literal words together with congruent 
movements, while metaphorical words influenced ERPs only 500 ms after word onset. Such a result 
suggests that participants were sensitive to the association between abstract concepts and vertical 
space in line with the metaphor “Good is up”, but that such an integration does not occur in a rapid 
and automatic manner.  
In conclusion, the influence of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory is clear. However, while there is 
evidence supporting this theory, there are a number of gaps that suggest the need for a more 
systematic approach; in particular, it is difficult to foresee that metaphors can be used in all domains 
where abstract concepts exist, and it does not seem plausible that the meaning of abstract words can 
be entirely explained by metaphors. 
 
Introspective and situational properties. 
According to this view abstract concepts, in comparison to concrete concepts, rely more on 
introspection and on social and institutional aspects of situations (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 
2005). This view is supported mainly by behavioral evidence, based, for example, on tasks in which 
participants are asked to generate the characteristics of a given concept.  
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005), for example, asked participants to produce characteristics of 
three abstract (e.g. “truth”), concrete (e.g. “bird”) and intermediate concepts (e.g. “farm”). Concepts 
were either presented in isolation or preceded by a short scenario. For example, for the concept 
‘‘truth,’’ the situation described a boy who told his mother that he had not broken a vase, and his 
mother believing him. This study found that both concrete and abstract concepts evoke properties 
related to situations. However, with concrete concepts the participants tended to focus on entities 
within situations (e.g. “car-wheels”), while abstract concepts focussed ‘‘on the social, event, and 
introspective aspects of situations (e.g., people, communication, beliefs, and complex relations).’’ 
(p. 152) (e.g. “true-difficult to discuss after Postmodernism”, “justice-beaurocratic”). Wiemer-
Hastings and Xu (2005) provided further evidence of this with a larger sample of concepts. These 
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results highlight that context availability per se is not unique to abstract concepts, since concrete 
concepts also evoke situations (see Moffat et al., 2015, for convergent evidence). However, even if 
abstract concepts do not evoke a higher number of contexts compared to concrete concepts, it is 
possible that the contexts they activate are more complex, since they involve more events and 
actions (Borghi et al., 2011; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Connell & Lynott, 2012). This would be in 
line with two unique aspects of abstract concepts. One unique aspect of abstract concepts is their 
“relational” nature (Gentner, 1981; Gentner & Boroditsky, 2001; Markman & Stilwell, 2001; 
Barsalou, 2003), i.e. the fact that they are often “characterized by their links to external concepts 
rather than by intrinsic properties, unlike most concrete concepts” (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005). 
The second unique characteristic is that their members are more diverse and heterogeneous than 
those of concrete concepts, thus the context can play an important role in connecting them, acting as 
a sort of glue. A similar mechanism operates with members of superordinate level concepts (e.g. 
“animal”, “vehicle”), which is the presence of a common and broad context, where many exemplars 
can coexist (e.g. “land” for animals). The presence of such a context facilitates the recognition of 
superordinate category members more than of the members of basic concepts (e.g. “car”, “dog”) 
(Borghi, Setti & Caramelli, 2005; Heit & Barsalou, 1996; Murphy & Wisniewsky, 1989).  
However, there are limitations to these conclusions, and evidence obtained in a recent dissertation 
(King, 2013) casts doubt on the relational character of all abstract concepts, and also highlights that 
context impacts processing in only some kinds of abstract concepts. Participants were presented 
with short scenarios, and were then asked to perform a lexical decision task on abstract words that 
were not mentioned during the scenario description. The scenario facilitated processing of 
“relational” abstract concepts (e.g., ‘‘ignore,’’ which describes an act, an actor, a patient being 
ignored, but no internal feeling), but it did not influence activation of mental states (e.g., 
‘‘depressed’’).  
Roversi, Borghi and Tummolini (2013) have provided evidence supporting the introspective and 
situational view, but also limiting its explanatory value to some kinds of abstract concepts. They 
asked participants to generate properties of concrete and abstract concepts of three different kinds: 
artefact, institutional and social concepts (e.g. “screwdriver-poetry”; “signature-ownership”; “party-
friendship”). They found that situations play an important role in characterizing abstract concepts. 
Their results also indicated that the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts was marked 
only in the case of social concepts, in which concrete concepts elicited more specific spatial and 
temporal relations, while abstract concepts evoked more general situational relations (e.g. 
“friendship-infancy”) and free associations (e.g., “friendship-pool”).  
Zwaan (2015) has built upon Barsalou and Wiemer-Hasting’s view on abstract concepts and 
situations. He has suggested that abstract concepts play a double role during discourse processing. 
They can assume an anaphoric function or a cataphoric function. This duality depends on whether 
longer parts of text are read or whether the abstract word is displayed early on in the discourse. 
When enough contextual information is provided, an abstract term such as “justice” activates a 
sensorimotor simulation. This simulation is then linked with symbolic representations that work 
anaphorically as “pointers to previously formed situational representation”. Extending this 
proposition further, we can instead consider the expression “Now justice is served”. This expression 
is characterized by a high level of ambiguity, as context to which it will be associated it is not yet 
clear . In such a case, the abstract concept can work cataphorically to provide a focus to help textual 
comprehension, in a similar way to pronouns. The sensorimotor system, activated once the abstract 
word is encountered, would be quickly disengaged to integrate further sensorimotor information. 
The concept would thus work as “a placeholder in an active state in working memory”, that can 
help to integrate sensorimotor information acquired later (Zwaan, 2015). This interesting proposal 
points out that concepts can differ depending on whether or not they are presented in isolation, and 
when they are introduced in a discourse.  
However, even if the author presents this explanation as an extension of the view according to 
which contextual information is less focal for abstract than for concrete concepts (Barsalou & 
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Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), this perspective seems to be more in line with the multiple representation 
theories. Zwaan (2015) appears indeed to assume that an interplay between sensorimotor, emotional 
and linguistically conveyed information occurs, at different moments in time, in line with such 
theories (see also Zwaan, 2014 and below).  
 
Strengths and limitations.  
In common with many of the theories evaluated within this review, the introspective and situational 
properties theory has strengths but also gaps in relation to its applicability and explanatory power. 
The hypothesis that abstract concepts activate introspective and social-situational components, has 
the advantage of being rather general and it can be applied intuitively to a wide range of concepts, 
from mental states to social concepts and to purely abstract concepts. However, as we have seen, 
the role played by context and by introspective properties varies in function of the content of 
specific concepts. A further limitation that weakens the validity of this theory is that, so far, 
evidence favoring this view has mainly been confined to property generation tasks (Pecher et al., 
2011), and, further, that supporting evidence obtained with different paradigms is needed. More 
importantly, in this theory, introspection is conceived as a form of conscious self-awareness, which 
provides a severely biased image of the relevant process. Indeed, it is possible that a more implicit 
form of metacognition plays a more extensive role in grounding abstract concepts (Frith, 2012), 
similar to the role it plays in supporting social interaction (Bahrami et al, 2010). In other words, the 
main limit of this view is that the mechanisms of this internal grounding have not been fully 
elucidated. For example, it could be hypothesized that, the more abstract a concept is, the more it 
requires grounding on information of internal states and processes (and possibly also some forms of 
internal speech), or that the more abstract they are, the more they need a complex context to put 
together the varied and sparse category members. These are only two of the possible interpretations: 
therefore it is essential that further research is carried out to determine and evaluate the underlying 
mechanisms. 
 
Affective Embodiment Account (AEA). 
A third perspective we will evaluate is the Affective Embodiment Account (AEA) and we will 
show that it provides important evidence that abstract and concrete concepts differ. The Affective 
Embodiment Account is a new theory which hypothesizes that abstract concepts evoke more 
emotions than concrete ones (e.g.Vigliocco et al., 2013; Kousta et al., 2011). The Affective 
Embodiment Account view of abstract concepts, outlined by Kousta et al. (2011; see also Kousta et 
al. 2009) and by Vigliocco et al. (2013), proposes that abstract and concrete concepts differ in terms 
of the experiences that characterize them. While perceptual and motor experience is more crucial 
for concrete concepts, affective experience and emotional development is more important for 
abstract concepts. Emotional development is presented as the basis for the acquisition of an abstract 
vocabulary: the Affective Embodiment Account proposes that emotions can provide a bootstrapping 
mechanism which favors the acquisition of abstract words (e.g. Vigliocco et al., 2013). AEA 
theorists argue that this is demonstrated by the fact that emotional abstract words are learned earlier 
than neutral abstract words. To illustrate and explain these conclusions, we will assess the 
behavioral and brain-imaging evidence supporting this view. These studies provide evidence that, 
for example, abstract words typically receive higher ratings for emotional associations and that 
areas involved in emotion processing are engaged during processing of abstract words (e.g. 
Vigliocco et al., 2014).  
Kousta et al. (2011) used a large sample of abstract and concrete words, controlled for a variety of 
dimensions such as familiarity, concreteness, abstractness, context availability (see Context 
Availability Theory, CAT), imageability (see Dual Coding Theory, DCT), and age of acquisition. 
Words were also controlled for mode of acquisition (Della Rosa et al., 2010; Wauters et al., 2003). 
Mode of acquistion determined whether the word was acquired perceptually (e.g. by interacting 
with the object it refers to; “bottle”), linguistically (e.g. by listening to explanations; “philosophy”), 
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or with a mixture of both modalities (e.g. being shown a picture and explained the word meaning; 
“tundra”). The authors found an advantage in lexical decision of abstract over concrete words. That 
is to say, once imageability and context availability are controlled for, the concreteness effect was 
substituted by an abstractness effect. This same abstractness effect was found in regression analyses 
of lexical decision response times for a large sample of words (n. 2330).  
The advantage of abstract over concrete words can be explained by the difference in valence 
between concrete and abstract concepts: Kousta et al. (2011) therefore proposed that affective and 
emotional information has a major weight in characterizing abstract words. They concluded that, 
because context availability and imageability were kept constant, classical theories such as the 
Context Availability Theory or the Dual Coding Theory cannot account for these data. Even if the 
Dual Coding Theory recognizes the importance of emotions (Paivio, 2007; 2013), the presence of 
emotional connotations for non-emotional words would derive from their link with imagistic 
representations. Thus, emotional connotations should be more frequent with concrete than with 
abstract concepts (Vigliocco et al., 2013). In addition, given that modality of acquisition was kept 
constant, they argue that differences in activation of linguistically conveyed information do not 
exhaust the differences between concrete and abstract concepts, and that emotions play a major role 
in abstract concept representation. Valence however does not seem to exhaust the meaning of 
abstract words: the advantage of abstract words in accuracy was still maintained even when the 
effect of valence was removed. This might be due to the role played by linguistically conveyed 
information for abstract concepts. Furthermore, controlling for valence can lead to conflicting 
results: in a recent ERPs study with stimuli controlled for imageability, context availability and 
valence, the abstractness effect was replicated in response times but a reverse concreteness effect 
was obtained with ERPs (Barber et al., 2013). fMRI results further support the Affective 
Embodiment Account, but here too there is controversial evidence on the role played by valence. 
Vigliocco et al. (2014) performed an fRMI study with a lexical decision task and stated that, while 
concrete and abstract concepts activated the visual processing system involving occipital, temporal 
and subcortical areas, only abstract concepts engaged the rostral anterior cingulated cortex (rACC). 
rACC plays a regulatory role during emotions processing. However, the conclusions drawn by 
Vigliocco et al. (2014) have been questioned by Skipper and Olson (2014) who confirmed that 
rACC responds to valence, but not to abstract words: controlling for valence they found that the 
right STS and right temporal pole were the only regions that remained exclusively responsive to 
abstract concepts.  
Further evidence partially favoring the Affective Embodiment Account has been collected with 
patients with neurodegenerative diseases. Catricala’ et al. (2014) submitted patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and with primary progressive aphasia (sv-PPA) to the same tasks (Della 
Rosa et al., 2014) using both concrete and abstract words. Results showed that AD patients differed 
from controls in all tasks with concrete and abstract items, while the sv-PPA group differed from 
controls in all concrete tasks, but only in the sentence completion task for abstract concepts, that is, 
only in production and not in comprehension tasks. The authors deepened their analysis by 
categorising abstract concepts into two types: social concepts and emotions. They demonstrated that 
sv-PPA patients were impaired only in social concepts, and AD patients in all abstract concepts 
with the exception of emotion concepts. 
 
Strengths and limitations.  
Overall, evidence favoring the Affective Embodiment Account is based on results obtained with 
different methods, from behavioral studies to fMRI investigations. An obvious conclusion is the 
importance of emotions for abstract concepts. The AEA researchers have also identified a 
bootstrapping role played by emotions to facilitate learning of abstract concepts. They add weight to 
this conclusion by arguing that emotion development precedes language acquisition. However, this 
could also be said for other cognitive abilities, for example novelty detection (see Crutch et al., 
2013).  
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The Affective Embodiment Account, however, has three limitations with relevant implications. 
First, the evidence supporting it is not fully consistent. For example, ERP studies revealed a 
dissociation between an abstractness effect in RTs and a concreteness effect in ERPs. A very recent 
study in which facial muscle activity was measured during visual word recognition found a valence 
effect in the m. corrugator supercilii with concrete but not with abstract words (Kuenecke, Sommer, 
Schacht, & Palazova, 2015). Another recent ERPs study with a lexical decision task with concrete 
and abstract verbs of different valence has revealed that the emotion related EPN effect, i.e. an early 
posterior negativity effect associated with attention to word meaning, emerged earlier for concrete 
than for abstract verbs (Palazova, Sommer & Schacht, 2013). These results clearly contradict the 
Affective Embodiment Account, which would predict the opposite result. Second, the role of 
valence does not seem to account for all the variance, and thus it cannot offer an exhaustive 
explanation of the mechanisms underlying abstract concepts (see previous discussion of the 
behavioral results by Kousta et al., 2011, and of the fRMI results by Vigliocco et al., 2013). Third, 
it is possible that the results obtained were biased by the presence, within the sample of abstract 
concepts, of emotional concepts. Altarriba et al. (1999) (see also Setti and Caramelli, 2005) have 
contended that emotions represent a subset not to be included within abstract concepts, and have 
proposed that a trichotomy between abstract-concrete-emotional words exists rather than a simple 
abstract-concrete dichotomy.  
Let us consider the issue from an embodied perspective. Emotions are very basic functions, 
activated by rather primitive stimuli, such as smell. Emotion concepts can be seen as either a 
peculiar or a separate subset within abstract concepts, for which an embodied explanation is more 
straightforward and intuitive than for other abstract concepts, because they are typically associated 
with specific bodily expressions/states. It has been shown that the mechanisms underlying 
representation of emotions and of sensorimotor processes is the same, and are based on simulation 
and re-enactment of the situations experienced while interacting with the world (Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011). While such mechanisms may play an important role in explaining purely 
abstract concepts, they are clearly insufficient to fully explain them.  
In sum: all emotional concepts are to a certain extent abstract, but it not clear whether all abstract 
concepts have affective/emotional connotations. Kousta et al. (2009) have suggested that valence is 
not a characteristic limited to emotional words, but that it can be extended to many concepts. The 
claim that emotional aspects characterize abstract concepts is certainly plausible. However, it 
should be clarified whether the effects found depend on the inclusion of emotional concepts within 
the sample of abstract concepts, or whether they depend on a mechanism underlying the 
representation of all abstract concepts. Indeed, the contention that emotional valence increases with 
abstractness needs to be corroborated by further investigation.  
 
The two last theories evaluated here share a common strength. They do not characterize abstract 
concepts in terms of what they miss, but, rather, in terms of their specific characteristics. 
Unfortunately, they also share the same limitation. Data collected so far convincingly demonstrates 
that abstract concepts evoke more introspective and situational aspects, as well as more emotions. 
However, this result can be linked to the specific content of the concepts included in the database. 
For example, introspective properties might be more frequently evoked by abstract mental state 
concepts, such as “meditation” or “thought”, than by other abstract concepts such as “situation” or 
“event”. It is certainly important to distinguish concepts on the basis of their content, but it is even 
more important to identify the mechanism underlying abstract concept formation and use, as well as 
which mechanism becomes more active as the abstractness level of a concept is raised.  
 
Multiple representation theories 
Multiple representation theories of abstract concepts represent a valuable and novel addition to 
current thinking and appear to be a promising avenue of research. Researchers who endorse this 
perspective have claimed that, even if abstract concepts are embodied in perception, action, and 
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emotion, they also rely more on re-enactment of linguistic experience. They also state that both 
sensorimotor and linguistically conveyed information is involved in the representation of concrete 
and abstract concepts, but that these pieces of information are differently distributed depending on 
the type of concept: perception and action information is more important for concrete concepts, 
emotion and linguistically conveyed information for abstract ones. As we will see, while all 
multiple representation views highlight the importance of language for abstract concepts 
representation, they characterize the role of language differently: language can be considered 
simply as a shortcut to access word meaning (LASS theory), or it can be given a more crucial role, 
as a means of improving thought processes (Dove’s representational pluralism), and as a complex 
bodily and social experience (WAT theory). 
This review will focus in particular on four multiple representation theories that are currently 
influential, or have the potential to be so: the LASS (Language And Situated Simulation) view (e.g., 
Barsalou et al., 2008), the representational pluralism view proposed by Dove (2009; 2011; 2014), 
the WAT (Words As social Tools) view (Borghi, 2013; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi & 
Cimatti, 2009), and the grounding and sign tracking proposal by Prinz (2002, 2012).  
 
LASS (Language And Situated Simulation). 
According to the Language And Situated Simulation (LASS) view (Barsalou et al., 2008), multiple 
systems underlie our conceptual knowledge. LASS focuses on the linguistic and the simulation 
systems, which continuously interact. Consider the word “cat”. When we are presented with the 
word “cat”, we first activate the linguistic system, recognizing the word form and producing 
associated words, such as “dog”, “Siamese”, etc. We then start to ground the concept, for example 
visualizing the cat and re-enacting our interaction with it.  
As this example shows, according to the Language And Situated Simulation theory, the linguistic 
system is engaged to categorize words during their perception. During a linguistic task, such as 
lexical decision, the activation of linguistic forms peaks earlier, in line with the encoding specificity 
principle (Tulving & Thomson, 1973), While at this level words are processed only in a shallow 
way, when the simulation system is involved, processing is deeper, in line with the idea that, 
compared to words, images access the conceptual system more directly (Glaser, 1992; see also 
Paivio, 1986). Following word recognition the simulation system is activated, i.e. the brain 
simulates the sensorimotor and mental states active during interactions with the referents of the 
word. Word associations (e.g. “dog-dog’s bed”) can thus provide a shortcut, allowing fast access to 
conceptual information (Barsalou et al., 2008, and converging evidence: e.g., Pecher & Boot, 2011; 
Louwerse & Connell, 2011; Connell & Lynott, 2013). Put simply, according to LASS, words work 
as “pointers” to the object, entity, or situation they refer to.  
Property verification and fMRI research (review in Barsalou et al., 2008) has provided evidence for 
activation of the simulation system occuring in parallel with that of the linguistic system, but 
slightly more slowly. Simmons et al. (2008) conducted an fMRI study where participants performed 
a silent property generation task. Then, in a subsequent scanning section, they underwent two 
localizer tasks. In the first localizer task, they were asked to produce word associations for different 
kinds of concepts (e.g. common objects such as “car”, mental states such as “guess”, abstract 
concepts such as “extension” etc.), and in the second task to imagine a situation containing the 
concept. Early phases of word generation in the silent property generation task activated the same 
brain areas involved during the first localizer task, i.e. areas typically involved during linguistic 
tasks, such as the left inferior frontal gyrus (Broca’s area) and the right cerebellum. Late phases of 
word generation, however, instead activated the same brain areas involved during the second 
localizing task, i.e. brain areas that are typically active during mental imagery, such as precuneus 
and right middle temporal gyrus.  
Although these findings are novel and very compelling, there exist some caveats. Given that fMRI 
has a scarce temporal resolution, further research on timing would complement and further the 
predictions of the Language And Situated Simulation view. Most importantly, even if the reported 
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results provide evidence that the linguistic system is engaged earlier than the imagery system, this 
does not necessarily imply that meaning is only activated later, during activation of the simulation 
system, as the LASS theorists suggest. The activation of Broca’s area (see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004, for a review) could instead be evidence of the activation of the motor system to prepare for a 
situated action. 
In addition, the Language And Situated Simulation theory is not specifically aimed at explaining 
abstract concepts. In principle, one could conclude from its principles that, while concrete concepts 
activate the simulation system, abstract concepts activate the linguistic one. However, this 
conclusion is not proposed by the Language And Situated Simulation, even if is consistent with its 
principles. In contrast, LASS theorists claim, on the basis of fMRI evidence (Wilson-Mendenhall et 
al., 2013), that both concrete and abstract concepts activate a mixture of simulation and linguistic 
form information, that are differently distributed, depending on the task. They also argue that 
different brain areas are activated depending on the conceptual content.  
Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2013) asked participants to think deeply about an abstract concept (e.g. 
‘‘convince’’). They were then asked to verify whether the concept applied to the picture of a scene 
(e.g., a politician speaking) presented to them. This study showed that the brain areas related to the 
content of the concept were active, and that concrete and abstract concepts activated non-linguistic 
semantic information. For example, the concept “convince” activates brain areas related to 
mentalizing, and the concept “arithmetic” areas related to numerical processing. However, the lack 
of activation of linguistically conveyed semantic information can be biased by the fact that in this 
study words were processed only in relation to a subsequently presented picture. Processing a word 
in relation to an image differs from processing it in the context of other words, and such a control 
condition was not present. 
To summarize, the Language And Situated Simulation theory argues for “multiple representation” 
of both concrete and abstract concepts, stating that each concept, be it concrete or abstract, activates 
different brain areas depending on its content. It is the task, not the kind of concept, that determines 
a higher engagement of linguistic vs. sensorimotor areas. For example, lexical decision tasks, that 
require one simply to decide whether a word exists or not, activate the linguistic system more, while 
imagination tasks activate the simulation system preferentially. 
 
Strengths and limitations.  
The Language And Situated Simulation (LASS) is an important proposal because it is, to our 
knowledge, the first fully embodied theory that recognizes the importance for concepts of not only 
perception, action, and emotions, but also of language. Compared to the perspectives we have 
previously outlined in this review, LASS has a further strong advantage that sets it apart: it 
identifies a mechanism underlying conceptual representation, i.e. the parallel - but also slightly 
different in time - activation of the linguistic and sensorimotor system. However, such a mechanism 
is not specifically applied to the representation of different kinds of concepts, but rather to the 
adopted task. 
One final potential limitation of  LASS is that it argues that language is simply used as a shortcut to 
access meaning, and it is implied that shallow linguistic tasks do not allow access to meaning. This 
is contradicted by evidence suggesting that access to meaning is very fast, as it can occur 150 ms 
after word onset (e.g. Hauk et al., 2004).  
 
Representational pluralism. 
The second Multiple Representation theory presented here is Representational Pluralism. This 
theory was proposed by Dove (2009, 2011, 2014), and unlike the Language And Situated 
Simulation view, is devoted specifically to the explanation of abstract concepts. In its original 
formulation, this view argued that, while concrete concepts could be explained through an 
embodied view, abstract concepts could not (Dove, 2009). More recently, Dove (2011, 2014) has 
suggested that both abstract and concrete concepts are embodied, although to different extents. This 
 20 
view can, however, be considered as being hybrid in nature, as it combines embodied and non-
embodied aspects. Dove is namely committed to representational pluralism, and proposes that to 
account for the representation of abstract concepts we must leave room for some amodal 
representations.  
Dove’s theory relies on Paivio’s (1986) Dual Coding Theory, and can be considered as the attempt 
to return some important aspects of DCT to the forefront by adopting an embodied framework. 
Dove clarifies that his theory departs from Paivio’s view in that he takes an embodied stance, 
proposing that perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999) rather than mental images are the basic units of 
both verbal and non-verbal representations. Perceptual symbols are perceptual experiences that 
involve all senses and can be combined in the same way as symbols. These symbols can be 
multimodal, schematic, and they are not necessarily conscious. Language plays a major role in 
abstract concepts representation. According to Dove, linguistic representations are only partially 
embodied. They are embodied because they rely on sensorimotor simulations, but they acquire 
meaning not because of this form of embodiment, but because of their relationship with other 
words. In this sense, this view is also close to distributional approaches, according to which 
meaning is derived from associations between words (e.g. Andrews et al., 2014). 
The prevailing importance of language defines what abstract concepts are, allowing them to be 
distinguished from concrete concepts. Language plays an essential role, as it empowers our 
cognitive capabilities by serving as a medium of thought thanks to its combinatorial characteristics 
(Dove, 2011, 2014). According to Dove, when we acquire language, we acquire a new and 
powerful representational system, which interacts with other embodied systems but does not 
overlap with them. This system consists of simulations that can be selective and partial, and do not 
involve forms of inner speech, since simulations can be completely unconscious. Language in his 
view is “is an internalized amodal symbol system that is built on an embodied substrate.” 
According to Dove, a fully embodied account of the syntactic, morphological, and phonological 
structure of language is unattainable: even psycholiguistics accounts that posit significant 
interaction between comprehension and production systems (such as Pickering & Garrod's theory, 
2013) are not fully embodied, since they generally rely on intermediate representations that work as 
a bridge between production and comprehension (Dove, 2013). 
Although Dove does not directly produce evidence to support his theory, he discusses recent 
evidence that demonstrates the importance of imageability for conceptual processing. He reports 
studies on double dissociations showing that, while damage of the left hemisphere leads to a 
selective semantic impairment for high imageable words, the opposite case is also observed. 
Furthermore, he discusses ERPs studies showing a larger and more anterior N400 for abstract 
compared to concrete words, which would suggest that different systems are employed for the two 
kinds of concepts. His conclusions are further supported by fMRI studies that have shown a higher 
engagement of superior regions of the left temporal lobe and inferior regions of the left prefrontal 
cortex for abstract compared to concrete words, and right hemisphere or bilateral activation in the 
case of concrete words.  Dove notes that while the evidence he uses clearly shows that two different 
neural systems are engaged (e.g. Adorni & Proverbio, 2012), it is compatible both with the view 
that linguistic representations are modal and with those claiming that they are amodal, and further 
research is needed to disentangle this complex issue.  
Dove (2015) further contributed to the debate surrounding embodied cognition by suggesting that 
abstract concepts pose three different problems to embodied cognition, for which different solutions 
can be available. The first problem he notes is generalization, which is the problem of how we are 
able to represent information that goes beyond our experience. The second issue is the problem of 
flexibility, which arises because it is possible that embodied representations are activated 
differently, or at different levels of depth, depending on the context and task. The third and final 
challenge is the problem of disembodiment: the “embodied” nature of abstract concepts needs to be 
demonstrated, and represents a challenge for embodied cognition. All three problems pertain to both 
concrete and abstract concepts, but are particularly urgent and marked for the latter.  
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However these issues are not without solutions and each theory can be suitable to handle and solve 
different problems. Consider for example the emotion-based Affective Embodiment Account: while 
it partially solves the problem of disembodiment, showing that abstract concepts are also grounded 
in bodily states, it seems unable to handle the problems of flexibility (why should emotional 
systems be differently activated depending on the task and context?), of generalization (e.g. how to 
account for the formation of high level superordinate concepts, such as “animal”?), and to explain 
why sensorimotor experience is so crucial for some concepts and less so for others.  
 
Strengths and limitations.  
The theory proposed by Dove has many advantages, among which is the important recognition of 
the role played by linguistic experience in conceptual processing. However, in common with many 
theories presented in this review, further research is required to provide conclusive evidence in 
favour of this theory. This limitation is particularly marked for this theory as it is not directly 
supported by empirical work, even if the author illustrates and discusses convergent evidence. 
Furthermore, much of the behavioral and neuroscientific supporting evidence he reports relies on 
the important role of imageability. However, it has been recently shown that imageability is 
correlated but cannot be conflated with abstractness (e.g., Kousta et al., 2011; see above). An 
additional limitation is that this theory focuses on concept representation in adults, without 
considering how concepts are acquired. Furthermore in its different formulations it remains 
ambiguous as to the role played by amodal and perceptual symbols.  
Another limitation of this theory, is that Dove initially claimed that abstract concepts are 
represented through amodal symbols (Dove, 2009). He then argued that even if abstract concepts  
activate sensorimotor simulations, this is not the way in which they acquire their meaning (Dove, 
2011), and claimed that language learning would lead to the acquisition of a "new dis-embodied 
semantic system". In this respect, the relation between this view and the fully  embodied the Words 
as Social Tools (WAT) proposal, which will be discussed later in this review, should be further 
explored. At a general level, the two theories partly overlap, since both claim that concepts can 
either be associated mainly with non-linguistic experience of the world or with experience of 
language. Furthermore, the conception of language as an instrument that extends thought 
capabilities is fully compatible with the Words as Social Tools (WAT) view, and it helps in 
clarifying why language is helpful to represent abstract concepts. However, the two theories differ 
in their level of embodiment and in the space they leave for amodal representations. According to 
Dove (2011), his accounts differs from the Words as Social Tools (WAT) view “because it holds 
that the acquisition of language creates a new dis-embodied semantic system, one that has many of 
the properties usually associated with the amodal symbol systems favored by traditional cognitive 
science. In other words, natural language on my view is not merely another source of information 
about the world but is also another way of “thinking about the world.” While we fully appreciate 
the idea that language can contribute to improve our thinking capabilities, we believe that proposing 
to leave room for amodal representations, as Dove does in his proposal, risks incuring the symbol 
grounding problem that we discussed in the Introduction. In our view, this is a problem shared by 
all non-embodied, but also by all hybrid approaches to cognition. The amodal and arbitrary nature 
of language has been recently questioned by studies on iconicity in spoken and sign languages, 
showing the similarity between some characteristics of words and some features of their referents. It 
is the case of sound-shape correspondences: for example, words with rounded vowels – such as 
“bouba” or “maluma” - as typically used to refer to rounded shapes, words with unrounded vowels 
– as “kikki”, or “takete” - to jagged shapes) (Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006; Maurer, Pathman & 
Mondloch, 2006; Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014). In addition, we believe that not only amodal symbols, 
but also grounded symbols possess combinatorial properties and can exhibit productivity (Barsalou, 
1999). Grounded linguistic symbols exhibit, in our view, all the properties allowing them to support 
our thought processes. Finally, if with amodal symbols Dove refers to symbols represented in brain 
areas where information is integrated, we prefer to intend convergence areas in the brain (Damasio, 
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1989) as areas where multimodal information converges. The debate is obviously open, and new 
evidence is needed to provide definite answers, but we think that the most promising direction of 
research to explain abstract concepts is one that not only emphasizes the importance of language, as 
Dove’s theory does, but that also conceives language as a fully modal and embodied system, as 
Dove’s theory does only in part.   
WAT (Words As social Tools).  
WAT (Words As social Tools) (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Borghi, 2013) 
proposes that concepts are couched in representations that derive from both perceptual/motor and 
linguistic experiences. In common with the Language And Situated Simulation (LASS) theory, it is 
a fully embodied view, since it maintains that sensorimotor simulations need to be activated in 
order to grasp meaning.  
We, however, will consider this as a weak embodied view, similarly to the Language And Situated 
Simulation theory, because it argues that not only sensorimotor, but also linguistic areas – 
specifically, areas related to auditory processing, language production and phonology, etc. - and 
social areas, for example areas engaged during recognition of known others, are involved in 
representing the meaning of abstract concepts.  
According to the Words as Social Tools (WAT) proposal both concrete and abstract concepts are 
embodied. At the same time in the case of abstract concepts grounding in sensorimotor systems is 
not sufficient. In contrast to other theories emphasizing the role of language, the Words as Social 
Tools view considers not only the importance of word associations in explaining meaning. Consider 
the distinction between kinds of linguistic information we proposed at the beginning of the review: 
this proposal assumes that embodied forms of all kinds of linguistic information, i.e. of 
linguistically conveyed information, linguistic form information and syntactic linguistic 
information, concur in their representation.  Furthermore, this theory focuses also on the experience 
of language use itself, emphasizing the role of the social dimension in word acquisition. In this 
view, both concrete and abstract words are seen as social tools that help us to interact with others, 
and with the physical and social environment (for a more radical recent theory directly inspired by 
WAT that further elaborate similar themes see the Words as Cultivators (WAC) view - Schilhab, 
2015a, b).  
The Words as Social Tools (WAT) proposal has four main tenets, and these will be evaluated in 
light of recent evidence (for an overview of the theory, see Borghi & Binkofski, 2014). The first 
principle is that concrete and abstract concepts are characterized by different acquisition modalities 
(e.g. Bergelson & Swingley, 2013; Borghi et al., 2011; Granito et al., 2015). This implies that, 
given that abstract concepts do not have single, concrete referents, but rather have sparse and 
diverse referents, they will be acquired both through sensorimotor experience and linguistic input. 
In addition, the physical environment is less available as a scaffold to support the acquisition of 
abstract concepts than is the case for concrete ones: language itself plays a scaffolding role for 
abstract concepts. Literature on Modality of Acquisition (MoA: Wauters et al., 2003) shows that 
some words are acquired mainly through sensorimotor experience (e.g. “bottle”), more abstract 
words are mainly acquired through linguistic input (e.g. “philosophy”), while still other words have 
an intermediate status (e.g. “tundra”). While in early grades words are mainly acquired through 
perceptual modality, in Grade 6 texts the majority of words are learnt through linguistic input. 
Modality of acquisition and age of acquisition are correlated but not overlapping dimensions. 
However, studies on age of acquisition indicate that abstract concepts are acquired later than 
concrete ones, at a time when children have already mastered many words. One influential 
hypothesis on conceptual development maintains that, in order to acquire abstract words, children 
need to master a consistent amount of words and of linguistic knowledge, and that the acquisition of 
syntax and semantics are strictly interwoven (Gleitman et al., 2005).  
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The Words As social Tools (WAT) view contends that, while for concrete words children may 
simply (or mostly) base themselves on associative mechanisms between words and their referents, 
learning abstract concepts is likely to require not only linguistic knowledge, but also sophisticated 
social abilities. Importantly, not only the linguistic but also the social competence (Tomasello & 
Akhtar 2000) are particularly relevant for learning abstract words, since the selection of their 
referent is more difficult: it is not by chance that they were called “hard” words! (Gleitman et al. 
2005; Gentner, 2006; Gillette et al., 1999; Wauters et al., 2003). Studies investigating the early 
comprehension of abstract concepts (e.g. Bergelson & Swingley, 2013) reveal that abstract concepts 
(e.g. “all gone”) emerge at around 10 months and become more stable at around 14 months. 
Abstract concepts start to be comprehended in correspondence with the emergence of some 
important social abilities: the ability to follow the gaze of others; and the capability to develop 
forms of joint attention allowing children to determine what they and the adults “know together” 
(Carpenter et al., 1998). Literature on testimony found that pre-school children are willing to 
receive clarifications from adults, and that at around three or four years of age they are able and 
keen to monitor the accuracy of the information they receive (Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Sabbagh & 
Baldwin, 2001). Crucially, testimony is particularly relevant in domains where the environmental 
inputs are insufficient (Harris & Koenig, 2006), such as those of abstract concepts.  
The second principle of the Words as Social Tools (WAT) view is that different acquisition 
modalities influence the conceptual representation in the brain. Given the diversity and sparse 
character of their referents, abstract concepts should engage brain areas that are more distributed 
and less focused than those associated with concrete concepts (see Rodríguez-Ferreiro, Gennari, 
Davies, & Cuetos (2011) for consistent fMRI evidence with abstract verbs). According to the 
Words as Social Tools (WAT) view, while both concrete and abstract concepts activate 
sensorimotor networks, the areas that are part of the language processing system are more activated 
by abstract than by concrete concepts processing. To verify this hypothesis, Sakreida et al. (2013) 
and Scorolli et al. (2012) performed an fMRI and a TMS study based on a previous behavioral 
study (Scorolli et al., 2011) using sentences in which both the noun and the verb could be concrete 
or abstract (e.g. “to caress the dog/the idea”, “to think of the dog/the idea”). The fMRI study 
demonstrated that abstract concepts activated the core sensorimotor areas, i.e. the left lateral 
(precentral gyrus) and the medial (supplementary motor area) premotor cortex. While the purely 
concrete expressions (e.g. “to caress the dog”) elicited activation within the left inferior frontal 
gyrus (pars triangularis) and two foci within the left inferior parietal cortex, purely abstract word 
pairs  (e.g. “to think of the idea”) engaged the anterior part of left middle temporal gyrus, that is to 
say part of the language processing system. Consistently, in the TMS study, phrases containing both 
concrete and abstract verbs activated the hand-related motor system (MEPs, motor evoked 
potentials), but the activation of this system was delayed with phrases containing abstract verbs. 
This might be due to a cascade flow of activation from the mouth- to the hand-related motor areas. 
There is a limitation to the TMS study, as its interpretation remains partly speculative, since no 
control study was run with the mouth’s MEPs. Furthermore, results of the TMS study converged 
with the ones of the behavioral study (Scorolli et al., 2011) in showing that response times were 
faster for congruent pairs (abstract verb-abstract noun, concrete verb-concrete noun) than for non 
congruent ones (Scorolli, 2014). This suggests that abstract and concrete concepts are represented in 
partially differing circuits, and that switching from one circuit to the other (e.g. from the core 
sensorimotor to the linguistic system; see Sakreida et al., 2013) implies a cost in terms of 
processing time.  
 
The third principle of the Words as Social Tools (WAT) view is that different acquisition modalities 
lead to different embodied counterparts. WAT predicts that, due to their link with language, abstract 
concepts activate the mouth-related motor system more, while concrete concepts, more linked to 
manipulative actions, activate hand-related motor system more. This prediction has been supported 
by two studies (Borghi et al., 2011; Granito et al., 2015) in which participants were taught new 
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categories and then novel labels and by a study in which participants were required to decide 
whether abstract and concrete definitions matched with concrete and abstract concepts (Borghi & 
Zarcone, 2016).  
Borghi et al. (2011) operationalized concrete categories as novel 3D objects presented on the 
computer screen, which differed in color and shape, and abstract words as groups of moving objects 
that interacted in novel ways. Participants were asked to “manipulate” the concrete objects by 
moving them on the computer screen, and to observe the interaction of the members of abstract 
categories. A subsequent property verification task (“is XX a property of CALONA?”) revealed 
that, while responses  to concrete words were faster with the hand, i.e. when participants had to 
press a key on the keyboard, abstract words were facilitated with responses with the mouth, i.e. 
when participants had to say “yes” on the microphone. The advantage of the mouth was more 
pronounced when abstract concepts were introduced using not only names, but also explanations of 
their meaning. Further evidence supporting this principle of the Words as Social Tools (WAT) view 
was provided by Granito et al. (2015), who replicated the mouth advantage with abstract concepts. 
In this study novel names and explanations of the category meaning were introduced by a 
researcher in order to mimic the social situation that typically characterizes conceptual acquisition.  
Results revealed that, with abstract words, participants who had undergone the linguistic training 
performed better than the other participants when they were required to respond with the mouth 
(microphone) in a categorical recognition task (“Do XX and YY belong to the same category?”) 
(Granito et al., 2015).  
Further rating studies in which participants were asked how much different effectors were involved 
with action wth target words/sentences confirmed the association between abstract concepts and the 
mouth. Granito et al. (2015) and Borghi and Zarcone (2016) found that participants associated 
concrete categories with the hand, and abstract categories with the mouth. Ghio et al. (2013) found 
convergent results: they showed that while abstract concepts related to mental states and emotions 
are more associated with the mouth, number concepts are more associated with the hand, probably 
due to the influence of finger counting on numerical cognition (Fischer & Brugger, 2011; Ranzini et 
al., 2011; see also Moseley, Carota, Hauk, Mohr & Pulvermüller, 2012, for fMRI evidence showing 
that abstract emotional words, beyond limbic regions, engage areas of the precentral cortex 
activated somatotopically by mouth and hand words, and Moseley, Shtyrov, Mohr, Lombardo, 
Baron-Cohen, & Pulvermüller, 2015, for evidence on the reduced brain activation with abstract 
emotion words in motor areas and cingulate cortex in Autism Spectrum Condition). Consistent 
results with numbers were found by Grade, Badets, and Pesenti (2016) who recently asked 
participants to randomly generate numbers after observing stimuli representing aperture or closure 
of fingers, mouth and hand. They found that number meaning is mainly grounded in mechanisms 
linked to finger control; mouth influence was limited to opening, and led to an overproduction of 
large numbers. Borghi and Zarcone (2016) recently performed the first behavioral study in which 
the association between abstract words and the mouth was demonstrated with real words and with 
an implicit task in which response times were recorded. Participants were asked to decide whether 
abstract and concrete definitions presented as prime matched with abstract and concrete target 
words using a device to press within the teeth or pressing a keyboard with the index finger. 
Response times with the mouth were overall slower, likely due to the device used, but the 
advantage of the hand over the mouth responses was more pronounced with concrete than with 
abstract target-words.  
fMRI studies have provided further evidence potentially in line with the Words as Social Tools 
(WAT) proposal, and have shown that abstract concepts activate the left inferior frontal gyrus and 
the left middle temporal gyrus (for meta-analyses see Wang et al., 2010; Binder et al., 2009). The 
left inferior frontal gyrus region is involved in language production and phonological processing, in 
subvocalization (Fiebach et al., 2007), for example during processing of pseudo-words in lexical 
decision, or in working memory maintainance (Petrides, 1994); a TMS study has shown that lexical 
decision with abstract words was less accurate after stimulation of this area (Papagno et al. 2009). 
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The activation of this region suggests that the linguistic areas related to the vocal and motor aspects 
of word processing are activated (Lieberman, 2009). Recent fMRI evidence from Hoffman et al. 
(2015) confirmed that concrete concepts are more associated with visual experience and abstract 
with acoustic experience, as revealed by the higher activation of dorsolateral temporal areas for 
abstract concepts and of ventromedial temporal areas for concrete ones, while both kinds of 
concepts converge in activation of ventrolateral anterior temporal lobe (ATL). Further fMRI 
evidence with an orthographic judgement task is in line with the Words as social Tools (WAT) 
view. It revealed that, compared to concrete concepts, additional language areas were engaged by 
abstract concepts in bilateral superior temporal and bilateral middle temporal region (Kumar, 
2015).To summarize, fMRI studies converge in showing a higher engagement of the left inferior 
frontal gyrus, typically engaged for language production and phonological processing, of the 
superior temporal gyrus, involved in auditory processing but also in social cognition (see Martin, 
2016, for showing how social/emotional concepts are grounded in a circuit connecting anterior 
temporal and prefrontal regions, crucial for social functioning), and of the middle temporal gyrus, 
which is engaged during language comprehension while reading and during known faces 
recognition. The behavioral results on the activation of the mouth and the activation of the brain 
areas we have described are compatible with the idea that to access the meaning of abstract words 
we re-enact previous acquisition experiences of the word, and also internally rehearse words or re-
explain their meaning to ourselves. This can occur at least in part through internal language. Further 
fMRI data has revealed that not only linguistic areas are activated, but also areas related to 
experiential components, such as the right hemisphere (superior frontal gryus, precuneus, 
D’esposito et al., 1997, anterior cingulated cortex, amygdala, parieto-occipital junction, Perani et 
al., 1999), occipital gyrus (Jessen et al., 2000). Overall, neural evidence reveals, in keeping with the 
Words as Social Tools (WAT) view, that areas related to both sensorimotor and linguistic 
experiences are activated by abstract concepts, that the role of linguistic areas is more important for 
abstract than for concrete concepts, and it suggests that these linguistic areas can involve 
subvocalization.  
The fourth principle of the Words as Social Tools (WAT) proposal is that given the crucial role of 
language in the formation of abstract concepts, these are more likely to be influenced by differences 
between languages than concrete concepts. For example, Malt et al. (1999) have shown that the 
concrete concept of “container” is highly variable across languages in terms of naming but not in 
terms of knowing: when Chinese-, Spanish- and English-speaking participants were asked to 
perform a sorting task, the crosslinguistic variability disappeared and they adopted the same criteria 
in grouping containers. In contrast, much evidence has revealed that the abstract concept of “time” 
varies across languages not only in terms of naming, but also in terms of the conceptual content: for 
example, time evokes the vertical dimension for Mandarin Chinese, but the horizontal for North 
American participants (see Borghi & Binkofski, 2014, for an analysis in depth of this aspect).  
 
Strengths and limitations.  
The Words as Social Tools (WAT) view has a number of strengths. The first and most important is 
that it is based on a mechanism that characterizes abstract concepts: the more abstract the concepts 
are, the greater is the linguistically conveyed and linguistic form information that should be 
necessary to compensate the reduced perceptual experience and to keep together their different 
members. Being an embodied theory, the Words as Social Tools (WAT) view does not suggest that 
this mechanism, i.e. the activation of linguistically conveyed and linguistic form information, is in 
contrast with the fact that abstract concepts activate their content. Another strength of the Words as 
Social Tools (WAT)  view over other theories, is that it focuses not only on conceptual 
representation but also on word acquisition. It has the potential, therefore, to unify two separate 
streams of research, the first being word acquisition in children and the second representation of 
abstract concepts in adults.  
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Evidence on both acquisition and brain organization confirms the importance of linguistically 
conveyed information and of linguistic form information for abstract concepts. However, while the 
claim that conceptual acquisition influences conceptual representation in the brain is very strong, it 
remains speculative, and should be further developed and investigated. In addition, the concept of 
modality of acquisition should be further analyzed to solve the dilemma of whether what counts is 
only the initial acquisition or also the successive times in which a given word is used, re-negotiating 
its meaning. Furthermore, should such acquisition necessarily occur through a social process or 
could it also occur through written texts, such as when we read information on Wikipedia?  
One final limitation of the Words as Social Tools (WAT) proposal is that the main evidence 
collected so far derives from studies on word acquisition in adults and studies on the neural 
underpinnings of abstract concepts; further studies on infant and child acquisition should be 
conducted, as should further cross-cultural studies, to test the hypothesis that abstract concepts are 
more affected by linguistic variability than concrete ones.  
 
Grounding and sign tracking 
The fourth Multiple Representation theory discussed here is Grounding and Sign Tracking, which is 
very close to the Words as Social Tools (WAT) view we have just discussed. The philosopher Prinz 
(2002, 2012) has recently proposed that we understand words using a tracking strategy: to capture 
their meaning, we need to anchor and link them to something non-verbal, their referents. The same 
process holds for both concrete and abstract categories, which, similarly to concrete ones, are 
correlated with features that are perceivable and which can work as signs to track the category. 
Prinz outlines different strategies that can be used to understand abstract concepts.  
One possible strategy is to ground them in concrete scenarios: for example, “justice” can be 
simulated with a scenario reproducing inequality: one person gets two cookies, another person 
three. Grounding concepts in situations might not, however, hold for all abstract concepts. Besides 
sign tracking, we may adopt other strategies which include metaphorical projection (see the 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory), the reference to internal states and emotions, and labeling. Concepts 
such as “meaningful activity” are comprehended introspecting motivations and emotions, while 
other concepts, such as “truth” and “identity”, can be understood through labeling, thanks to a 
network of associate words. Linguistic associations alone, however, are not sufficient to wholly 
capture meaning: in order to fully understand words we need to ground them. Crucially, Prinz has 
highlighted the importance of both mental imagery and verbal skills in accessing the concept 
meaning. Overall, he contends that comprehending abstract concepts implies the capacity ‘‘to 
match mental images with reality and sentences with testimony’’ (Prinz 2012). A novel aspect of 
his theory is that he underlines the importance of testimony for getting the conceptual gist: for 
example, to learn the concept of “democracy” we need to track definitions used by authoritative 
members of our community.  
Strengths and limitations.  
This theory proposed by Prinz has, in our view, many advantages. This perspective not only 
identifies some underlying mechanisms but highlights a range of different possibilities that can 
underlie the formation of abstract concepts. It therefore points out the flexibility of our conceptual 
system. Another strength of this theory is that these mechanisms are differently activated depending 
on the kind of concepts. This points out an important aspect: the fact that abstract concepts are very 
diverse and heterogeneous, and that different kinds of explanations can be used  to account for 
them. Furthermore, although Prinz identifies different strategies, this is a fully embodied view, 
which also extends to language. An important and novel aspect that characterizes his theory is the 
role it ascribes to testimony: in order to understand the meaning of abstract concepts we may need 
to refer to authoritative members of our community.  
Although it is evident that there are a number of merits to Prinz’s work, the major weakness of this 
theory is that in its present form it is still more of a proposal than a structured theory. Furthermore, 
the proposal does not consider some important aspects, such as the link between concepts 
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acquisition and concepts representation. In addition, it highlights the role of words only in terms of 
the past experiences they re-enact, not as a possible means to perform actions. However, the 
proposal could be extended to include these aspects.  
 
Multiple representation views: further evidence.  
 
As made clear in the course of the review, multiple representation views are emerging as the 
theoretical frameworks with the potential to solve the challenge of abstract concepts. Specifically, 
we believe that the most promising directions of research are inspired by those multiple 
representation views that combine a fully embodied approach with the recognition of the 
importance of language intended not only in terms of word associations but in its holistic aspects. 
We will now illustrate some recent studies that further support multiple representation views, 
showing that - depending on the task and on the level of processing it implies - different kind of 
information is activated. Specifically, we will focus on studies that highlight both the role of 
emotions and the pivotal role played by language for abstract concepts.   
Recent studies have investigated the role of emotions and context availability for concrete and 
abstract concepts (Moffat et al., 2015; Newcombe et al., 2012; Siakaluk et al. 2014). Moffat et al. 
(2015) reported evidence that, while confirming the important role of context availability for 
conceptual processing in general, also revealed that its relevance is not unique to abstract concepts. 
In a series experiments Moffat et al. (2015) instructed participants to complete four tasks; firstly to 
read aloud only abstract words, secondly to read aloud only concrete words, thirdly to name aloud 
all words that appeared on the screen, and finally to name aloud all words, when concrete and 
abstract words were separately presented and blocked for emotions. The study concluded that, 
compared to other variables, context availability and emotions play an important role in 
characterizing concepts. With abstract words both emotions and context availability played a 
facilitatory role, such that higher ratings on these two dimensions were associated with faster 
responses. Context availability played a facilitatory role for both kinds of concepts: this suggests 
that it it is not a unique dimension of the first, but that it plays an important role for conceptual 
processing overall. Emotions instead both facilitated processing of abstract words and inhibited 
processing of concrete words:  this reveals that emotions play an important role for abstract 
concepts (see also Newcombe et al., 2012). Even if this evidence is read by the authors as consistent 
with the emotion-based view, it seems to us that it is only partially consistent with it. Indeed, it 
shows that emotions did not always play a role: when participants were simply required to name 
words, which were presented together and not blocked for emotions, only context availability and 
not emotions influenced processing. 
Further studies have revealed the importance of a variety of semantic dimensions for representation 
of abstract concepts. Recchia and Jones (2012) asked participants to generate 10 features for 
concrete and abstract concepts, in order to allow another participant to guess the target-word from 
their description. They found that abstract concepts benefit from rich linguistic contexts, while 
concrete concepts benefit from rich physical contexts. Thill and Twomey (2016) demonstrated that 
the variability of Age of Acquisition data can be hardly explained with traditional factors, and 
propose, in line with the Words As social Tools theory, that the degree of abstractness of a concepts 
depends on how much it goes beyond simple sensorimotor grounding, incorporating linguistic, 
social and also interoceptive features. In a recent study, Danguecan and Buchanan (2016) compared 
word recognition response times in four tasks requiring increasing depth of semantic processes, 
from standard lexical decision to sentence relatedness task. Manipulating abstractness (abstract vs. 
concrete words) and semantic neighborhood density (SND, high vs. low) they found that SND 
effects were always present with abstract concepts, but not necessarily for concrete ones. This 
evidence is clearly in line with the idea that linguistically conveyed information is crucial for the 
representation of abstract concepts (for converging evidence see also Goodhew et al., 2014).  
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Further evidence has been provided by Zdrazilova and Pexman (2013), who examined the effect of 
different semantic richness variables (context availability, semantic neighborhood, number of 
associates, sensory experience rating, valence, and arousal) on lexical decision and semantic 
categorization tasks with abstract concepts. They found faster response times (RTs) in lexical 
decision for abstract words which evoked more contextual information, and faster RTs in semantic 
categorization for abstract words that evoked both a richer sensory experience and a more positive 
emotional experience. The results, which support multiple representation views of abstract words, 
indicate that different dimensions – perceptual, emotional and linguistic - have a different and 
dissociable influence on tasks.  
In the same vein, a recent study by Farias et al. (2013) showed an interplay between semantic and 
perceptual properties with abstract words referring to politics. Participants were more likely to 
evaluate words associated with conservatism as louder when presented to the right ear, and words 
associated with socialism as louder when presented to the left ear, even if the sounds did not differ 
in intensity. The association between left and socialism-related words and right and conservativism-
related words was found also in a classification and a lexical decision task, controlling that the 
effects were not simply due to spatial compatibility (Farias, Garrido, Semin, 2016). Further work on 
political metaphors showed an influence of the left or right body balance on their attributions to 
political parties (Dijkstra, Eerland, Zijlmans, Post, 2014) Overall, this evidence highlights the 
multimodal character of abstract words; furthermore, it suggests that "an opposition between 
symbolic representational and modality specific representations is misleading at best" (Farias et al. 
2013, p. 5). 
 
Strengths and limitations. 
The evidence assessed in this section indicates that different experiential dimensions characterize 
abstract concepts. Multiple representation views, which are based on such an assumption, have for 
this reason multiple strengths. One of the most important is that by taking into account both 
linguistic and sensorimotor information, these proposals can provide a bridge between two 
approaches to meaning that were traditionally considered to be in opposition: the embodied and the 
distributional accounts.  
As we have seen throughout this review, any embodied approach attempting to provide an 
explanation for abstract concepts, is facing a major challenge. Distributional approaches do not 
share this problem, since they derive the meaning of both concrete and abstract words from their 
statistical distribution across languages (Andrews et al., 2014).  
However, as anticipated in the introduction, distributional approaches are unable to solve the 
“symbol grounding problem” (Harnad, 1990) that asks: how can the meaning of a word be 
explained only through reference to other words? And moreover, how could we understand what 
“bottle” means if we could not see, touch and experience bottles? Furthermore, distributional 
approaches do not take into account the emotional and social aspects that accompany language 
acquisition and use (see the Affective Embodiment Account (AEA) and the Words as Social Tools 
(WAT) theories). Finally, while distributional approaches are quite successful in explaining 
experimental results, they cannot predict results at the same level of detail and precision which 
characterizes embodied account. Even authors who propose that language encodes perceptual, 
spatial and temporal information recognize that the language statistics cues can contribute to 
meaning comprehension, but are not the only factors. Recent data, for example, has suggested that 
60% of the temporal relations such as the distance between cities or the chronological sequence of 
days and historical figures can be accessed through statistics (e.g. Louwerse, Raisig, Tillman, & 
Hutchinson, 2015). This, in our opinion, demonstrates that grounding of concepts is crucial to their 
full comprehension. 
Multiple representation views have two further strenghts. The first is that they can utilize and 
explain neuropsychological evidence showing double dissociations between the mastering of 
abstract and concrete words. The second is that multiple representation views seem to us the only 
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approach able to deal with the different kinds and varieties of abstract concepts. We will discuss 
these issues in the next two sections.  
 
Multiple representation views and neuropsychological evidence 
Even if discussing this evidence in detail is beyond the scope of the present work (see Borghi & 
Binkofski, 2014, chapter 5, for details), it is important to consider the effect linked to two 
syndromes, as well as their implications for the debate on concrete and abstract concepts (see the 
review by Shallice and Cooper, 2013, but also studies on Parkinson patients by Fernandino et al., 
2013a; 2013b).  
The first syndrome is deep dyslexia: patients make errors while reading aloud, but the majority of 
errors are made with words with concrete, or highly imageable, meaning (Shallice & Warrington, 
1975; Coltheart et al., 1987). The second syndrome is semantic dementia (Warrington, 1975) and 
herpes encephalitis (e.g., Warrington & Shallice, 1984): the results are rather inconsistent because 
according to some reports patients showed a mild reverse concreteness effect, i.e. their performance 
was better with abstract than with concrete concepts (e.g. Bonner et al., 2009). However, more 
recent studies in which imageability and frequency were controlled suggest that SD patients 
perform worse with abstract than with concrete words (Hoffman & Lambon Ralph, 2011; Giffard, 
Laisney, Desranges, & Eustache, 2015) (see also recent evidence on specific effects of mild 
amnesia while defining abstract words, Kim et al., 2015). The connectionist model proposed by 
Plaut and Shallice (2003) provides a  possible explanation for this impairment with abstract words, 
as it assumes that a reduced number of features of abstract words renders their representation 
weaker overall compared to concrete words.  
It is worth spending a few words on the role played by semantic dementia, caused by the bilateral 
degeneration of the anterior temporal lobes (ATLs), in the debate between embodied and amodal 
theories of semantics. Because the selective damage of a specific brain area causes semantic 
dementia, it has been proposed that a single neural area exists in the brain where all modalities are 
integrated: the anterior temporal lobe would work as a hub integrating white matter connections 
(spokes) and modality specific associative cortices (hub-and-spoke model, Patterson et al., 2007). 
Crucially for the present work, ATLs would play a pivotal role in representing abstract concepts 
(Pobric, Ralph, & Jefferies, 2009). Evidence on semantic dementia has been interpreted as favoring 
hybrid models, according to which modal and amodal systems concur in representing abstract 
concepts (e.g. Dove, 2015). We do not, however, believe that these data lead to an unequivocal 
conclusion. First, the evidence provided has been recently discussed (e.g. Gainotti, 2012; Simmons 
& Martin, 2009); furthermore, the pattern of data is complicated, firstly due to the limits of 
localization data, that only allow validation of a specific theory in an indirect way, and also because 
of the behavioral results: semantic dementia does not impair all abstract concepts – for example, it 
spares numerical concepts. Finally, proponents of embodied theories tend to represent association 
areas (Damasio, 1989) where information converge as multimodal (Simmons et al., 2005), or 
“heteromodal” (Bonner, Peelle, Cook & Grossman, 2013) (for a recent critical review, see 
McCaffrey, 2015). Hence, the debate remains open, even if explaining the impairment provoked by 
semantic dementia is certainly a challenge for embodied theories. Reviewing evidence on deep 
dislexia and semantic dementia, Shallice and Cooper (2013) contended that semantic representation 
of concrete and abstract words can be separable. They stated that the higher complexity of abstract 
concepts requires, at a minimum, mastery of high-level logical functions. For example, the concept 
of “bicycle” can be accounted for by the conjunction of  features such as “is a vehicle”, “has a seat 
and wheels”, etc. while to capture a concept such as “hope” we would need a logical structure as 
“Hope (X) if and only if desire (X) AND believe (possible (X))”. According to the authors, neither 
feature-based theories (e.g. Plaut & Shallice, 2003) nor embodied theories have sufficient 
computational power to be able to account for how we compile the meaning of abstract words such 
as “hope”.  
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How can researchers who endorse an embodied approach counter such objections? Different 
arguments can be advanced. First of all, one could question the “separability” of the two systems. It 
should be noted that not only behavioral and brain imaging studies (see above) but also  
neuropsychological evidence suggests that both concrete and abstract concepts are grounded in 
distributed action-perception circuits. A recent study on a double dissociation used a lexical 
decision task to show that a patient with a lesion in dorsolateral central sensorimotor systems was 
impaired in recognizing tool words, while a patient with rather specific focal lesion centered in the 
left supplementary motor area had a deficit with abstract-emotional word processing (Dryer et al., 
2015). This clearly indicates that sensorimotor systems are not peripheral for abstract concepts 
processing, and suggests that the two systems for concrete and abstract words are not completely 
separable but overlap at least partially. Second, one should better consider the potentialities of 
perceptual symbols and of linguistic symbols. One response, that Shallice and Cooper (2013) do not 
seem to consider, is to argue that perceptual symbols have the computational power which 
characterizes the linguistic symbolic system, as suggested by Larry Barsalou in his seminal 1999 
paper (Barsalou, 1999). A second possibility is to claim, as was recently done by Dove (2015), that 
the language system can offer the computational abilities necessary for the separate system 
proposed by Shallice and Cooper (2013). While Dove (2015) considers this linguistic system to be 
amodal, we do not see the necessity to hypothesize a transduction from linguistic experience to an 
amodal form of representation.  
 
Multiple representational view and multiple kinds of abstract concepts 
Many studies favoring multiple representation views have contended that different systems might 
be activated, depending on the task. For example, according to the Language And Situated 
Simulation (LASS) view the linguistic system is more activated during lexical decision tasks, which 
make small demands on semantic processing, while the simulation system is more activated during 
tasks that imply a deeper semantic comprehension, such as semantic decision tasks. Along the same 
lines, Zdrazilova and Pexman (2013) demonstrated that different measures of semantic richness are 
activated depending on the task.  
However, it might be also suggested that different representation systems are activated to a different 
extent, depending on the kind of abstract concepts we consider. Abstract concepts can be very 
different from each other: they include, for example, number concepts, emotional concepts (e.g. 
“love”), mental state concepts (e.g., “thought”), and purely abstract concepts (e.g., “truth”). 
Recently, the focus of research has been on investigating fine-grained distinctions between sub-
kinds of abstract concepts. It is indeed possible that, in a similar way to what happens with concepts 
referring to sensorial experiences such as taste (Simmons et al., 2005), or odor, and with perceptual 
properties, such as color and shape (e.g. Martin et al., 1996; Martin, 2007), different distributed 
patterns of experiential information characterize different kinds of concepts.  
Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2013) conducted a fMRI study that showed that concepts such as 
“convince” are represented in areas related to mentalizing and social cognition (e.g., medial 
prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus), while the concept “arithmetic” engages brain regions 
underlying numerical cognition (e.g., bilateral intraparietal sulcus). This study indicated that 
concepts are represented in a distributed manner that depends on their content. Further research 
should be devoted to identify eventual sub-sets of abstract concepts and to determine a validated 
selection criterion that should be used universally within research to allow for replication of 
findings. 
A promising novel manner to investigate subsets of abstract concepts, which is linked by different 
degrees of semantic relatedness, is to use multidimensional ratings in order to examine the 
contribution of different dimensions in abstract concept representation. (e.g. Crutch et al., 2012, 
2013 ; Troche et al., 2014). For example, Crutch et al. (2013) asked participants to rate concepts by 
dimensions as sensation, emotion, action, thought, social interaction, morality, executive function, 
quantity, time, space, and polarity. They used this approach starting from the hypothesis that further 
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dimensions beyond sensorimotor and emotional features characterize abstract concepts; for 
example, the social dimension (see the Words as Social Tools (WAT) proposal). On the basis of the 
ratings a high dimensional semantic space was generated, where the semantic relatedness between 
concepts was represented in terms of the distance between them. The validity of this representation 
was tested and validated, showing that the performance of a patient affected by global aphasia was 
worse when she had to identify a target presented within word pairs that were close together in the 
semantic space. It was also tested using the eyetracker with a visual word paradigm (Primativo, 
Reilly & Crutch, 2016).  
This method of investigating subsets of abstract concepts was also used by Ghio, Vaghi and 
Tettamanti (2013) to evaluate whether different abstract concepts (mental state-, emotion-, 
mathematics-related concepts) involved different parts of the body (mouth, hand). They found that 
the three kinds of concepts varied across different dimensions. For example, emotion and mental 
states were similarly rated in concreteness, context availability and familiarity. Emotion sentences 
were more associated with mouth, hand and leg movements than mental-state and mathematics-
related sentences, while math related sentences involved more hand movements than the other 
concepts (see also Ghio, Vaghi, Perani & Tettamanti, 2016 for an fMRI study on the same 
categories).  
Further studies have made use of feature generation tasks to identify differences between subtypes 
of abstract concepts. For example, Setti and Caramelli (2005) used a feature production task and 
found that concepts referring to nominal kinds (e.g. “error”), states of the self (e.g. “worry”), 
cognitive processes (e.g. “memory”), and emotions (e.g. “fear”) were characterized by different 
conceptual relations. In particular, emotion terms differed more from the other three subtypes.  
A further novel and promising way to identify sub-sets of abstract concepts is to investigate how 
different kinds of abstract concepts are encoded into signs by sign languages. Borghi, Capirci, 
Gianfreda and Volterra (2013) analyzed examples of abstract concepts taken from LIS (Lingua dei 
Segni Italiana), the visual-gestural language used within the Italian Deaf community (for a similar 
attempt see Roush, 2011, who analyzed, starting from the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, how 
concepts of politeness are represented in American Sign Language, ASL). The analysis suggests 
that a framework based on a single dimension, i.e. linguistic, sensorimotor or emotional, does not 
fully capture the meaning of abstract concepts. Instead, multiple sources of experiences converge, 
in different distributions, to represent abstract concepts. Many signs in LIS provide support for the 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory, as they make use of body parts in an iconic way to refer to 
underlying metaphors, such as “knowing is seeing”, “the chest contains feelings and emotions” or 
“the head is a container”: for example, in the sign TO LEARN all the extended digits rapidly touch 
each other and move toward the signer’s forehead, as when bringing something from the external 
space to the head. There are a range of LIS signs which can be viewed as supporting evidence for a 
number of theories discussed within this review. For example, consistent with views that assign an 
important role to linguistically conveyed information (WAT, Dove), purely abstract signs such as 
TRUE and TRUTH (VERO and VERITA’ in Italian) or as LANGUAGE/LINGUA are conveyed in 
LIS using a strategy known as “initialization”, i.e. reporting the initial letter of the correspondent 
word, as the letter V (“vero”, “truth”) or L (“lingua”, “language”).  
The results of this study on sign language led to two important conclusions. First, these results show 
that, even if all examples are consistent with an embodied view, none of the current theories or 
proposals are of a sufficiently general nature to be able to account for all examples of abstract 
concepts. Even the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, which could be the most important and influential 
theory, due to the fact that in sign languages meanings have to be expressed through iconic 
gestures, does not exhaustively explain the meaning of all concepts. Importantly, the results suggest 
that to express purely abstract concepts Italian Sign Language exploits linguistically conveyed 
information, regardless of whether it is derived from the same sign language, from a foreign sign 
language as ASL (Americal Sign Language) or from the corresponding spoken/written language 
(Italian, in this case). 
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Overall, the reviewed studies reveal that abstract concepts can differ widely in terms of content, and 
cast some doubts on whether a single theory might be able to explain all varieties of abstract 
concepts. We do not intend to claim that the proposals we have outlined have no merit. Instead, we 
suggest that all of them, even if to a different degree, contribute to a better comprehension of 
abstract concepts. However, to date no approach has proven able to account for all abstract 
concepts. This opens the possibility that multiple representation approaches are necessary to 
account for specific abstract concepts features and content, in their varieties and differences (Borghi 
et al., 2014; Ghio et al., 2013; Crutch et al., 2013; Wilson-Mendehall et al., 2013).  
Among multiple representation approaches, in our view the most promising ones are those that 
a.take into account the important differences in conceptual acquisition between concrete and 
abstract concepts; b. stress the importance not only of the linguistic but also of the social dimension 
for abstract concepts. Such an approach would imply a tighter interconnection between research on 
human sociality and its development, developmental research on conceptual acquisition, and 
behavioral and neuroscientific research on abstract concepts. Such an approach would be 
completely novel, and would go well beyond the proposed integrations between distributional and 
embodied approaches to abstract concepts that are becoming increasingly popular (e.g. Andrews et 
al., 2014).   
Conclusion 
 
Being able to explain how we form and use abstract concepts is pivotal to understand one of the 
most sophisticated abilities possessed by our species (Wang et al., 2015). We will first summarize 
the main characteristics that a successful theory of abstract concepts should display, discussing 
them in light of the proposals we have reviewed. We will then draw some conclusions and point to 
some open issues.  
Toward an successful theory of abstract concepts 
a. Focus on mechanism rather than on content. We think that an ideal theory should identify a 
mechanism rather than simply a content which characterizes abstract concepts. The most promising 
research directions, in our view, are offered by the proposals according to which both sensorimotor 
and linguistically conveyed information characterize abstract concepts. Even if we think that these 
theories are those from which more fruitful research directions can be derived, much work needs to 
be done: a clear specification of the mechanisms underlying the activation of linguistic, emotional 
and social information is needed. 
b. Link between acquisition and conceptual representation. Any thorough theory of abstract 
concepts should make precise predictions on conceptual acquisition, and on how the kind of 
acquisition influences conceptual representation. Both the Words As social Tools proposal (WAT) 
and (partially) the Affective Embodiment Account (AEA) focus on how concepts are acquired, and 
on how this influences their representation. WAT focuses on the different modality of acquisition, 
AEA on the bootstrapping mechanism played by emotions. However, much needs to be done to 
further elucidate the relationship between acquisition and brain representation.  
c. Role of "introspective" information for grounding abstract concepts (introspective and situational 
theory). Some form of metacognition is a feature that a systematic theory of abstract concepts 
should take into account. Interoception (perception of one's internal states and processes) is a form 
of experience that might play an important role, especially for abstract concepts. The introspective 
and situational theory appears to focus on such a mechanism, even though the kind of conscious 
self-awareness it implies can be misleading.  
d. Explanation of cross-linguistic variability. It is important for a thorough theory of abstract 
concepts to provide clear predictions and to be able to account for the variability of  the different 
kinds of abstract concepts across  languages. While discussing the Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
and (partially) the Words As social Tools proposals, we have seen that these views formulate 
specific predictions on cross-linguistic differences in abstract concepts representation.  
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e. Generabilizability. A thorough theory should be able to account for all abstract concepts, in their 
differences and varieties, and differences in their degree of abstractness. Theories based on 
mechanisms are more promising than content based theories, since they can be extended beyond 
specific domains. However, as anticipated, it is an open question whether to date theories are able to 
explain abstract concepts of different domains.  
Where the field is going 
Our analysis of the literature can help to comprehend where the field is, and where it is going. We 
will summarize below our main conclusions, and will then discuss them more in depth:  
a. views according to which abstract concepts representation can be explained exclusively on 
the basis of their grounding in sensorimotor systems or in linguistic systems are not 
empirically supported; 
b. multiple representations views represent a viable alternative, since they highlight the 
importance of different kinds of experiences: linguistic, emotional, social and sensorimotor. 
The major novelty in the field over the last few years has been represented by these views;  
c. among multiple representation views, we believe that the evidence so far has shown that an 
embodied view that takes into account the importance of language experience can be 
capable of explaining abstract concepts representations. In our perspective, while it is 
crucial to recognize the pivotal role language plays for abstract concepts, there is no need to 
posit that language makes use of amodal representations. It is important, instead, to 
underline the role of language for abstract concepts acquisition, focusing on language in its 
multifolded aspects, as a bodily, social and emotional experience, as well as to underline the 
role of language as a medium of thought, able to extend our cognitive abilities. This idea of 
language as a bodily and social experience is fully compatible with results showing a higher 
activation of the mouth with abstract concepts, and with brain imaging studies that indicate a 
higher activation of social cognition areas, and of linguistic areas involved in language 
production, in auditory processing, and in semantic processing. However, in the field 
opinions diverge as to the modal or amodal character of the language medium, and more 
research and theories are needed to disentangle this complex issue. Further research is also 
needed to explore more in depth the role played by emotional (see the Affective 
Embodiment Account (AEA) theory) and social and linguistic (see the Words as Social 
Tools (WAT) theory) information;  
d. while the most interesting perspectives in our view converge in showing that, compared to 
concrete concepts, abstract concepts are more (but not exclusively) characterized by social, 
emotional and linguistically conveyed information than by sensorimotor information, the 
most recent studies are also starting to identify sub-types of abstract concepts, in terms of 
the different distribution of the experiential information they evoke. This is a very fruitful 
research direction, useful to prepare a solid ground for the development of more compelling 
multiple representation views.  
While we hope we have been able to convey the message summarized in the above four points, we 
believe that some issues deserve more discussion. Our analysis of the literature comes together to 
form one central conclusion, that states that explanations based on a single strategy are insufficient 
and that we are now compelled to recognize that different experiences (emotional, social, linguistic, 
sensorimotor) play a role in abstract concepts representation. This claim can seem obvious, but we 
believe it is not. Until some years ago theories on abstract concepts were divided: distributional 
theories focused solely on the importance of linguistically conveyed information, embodied theories 
highlighted primarily the role of sensorimotor information, and views derived from Paivio’s Dual 
Coding  approach proposed that sensorimotor information was important for concrete concepts, 
linguistically conveyed information for abstract ones. More crucially, the pivotal role played by 
emotional and social information for abstract concepts has been underlined only very recently, 
respectively by the Affective Embodiment Account (AEA) and by the Words As social Tools 
(WAT) theories. In addition, the research direction that reconciles embodied and distributional 
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theories of meaning, ascribing importance to both sensorimotor and linguistically conveyed 
information, provides a novel way to account for all concepts; the insights of distributional theories 
are however particularly useful to explain abstract concepts, for which linguistically conveyed 
information has a major relevance.  
Still, one could argue that it is self-evident that concepts rely on different sources of information 
and different kinds of experiences, and that this also holds for concrete concepts. We hope to have 
shown that, even if concepts are arranged along a continuum, the distribution of these experiences 
differs substantially: while concrete concepts are grounded primarily in perception and action 
system, abstract ones re-enact more – but not exclusively - social, emotional and linguistic 
experiences. It would appear that these different strategies may have different activations, 
depending not only on the kind of task, but also on the kind of abstract concept. Further research is 
essential to deepen our understanding and should focus on investigating and defining the fine-
grained distinctions among abstract concepts, similar to those present for distinguishing between 
concrete ones. 
While the activation of a network of differently distributed brain areas - depending on the 
conceptual content - is in line with an embodied view, it remains to be clarified whether there is 
something distinctive about abstract concepts, which could explain why we perceive, rate and use 
abstract concepts in a different manner than with concrete concepts. 
An increasing amount of evidence, obtained with different techniques and methodologies, indicates 
that both linguistic and non-linguistic experiences contribute to the representation of both abstract 
and concrete concepts. This consideration is likely to be at the root of the recent success of hybrid 
approaches, such as the revitalization of the classic vision of Paivio (1986). 
While it is largely established that multiple forms of representation are needed to account for the 
complexity of abstract concepts, not all researchers in this area share the view that all systems are 
modal and the modality of systems remains an issue for further research (see Tomasino and 
Rumiati, 2013; Dove, 2009, 2015; see for a very recent proposal Reilly et al., 2016). We believe 
instead that there is no need to call for amodal representations and that a fully embodied view has 
the potential to meet the challenge of explaining abstract concepts. In addition, explaining abstract 
concepts would not require the adoption of a unique strategy. 
We have seen the advantages of multiple representation views when combined with an embodied 
approach, and we have seen that studies on activation of different dimensions are flourishing. We 
have argued within this review that multiple representation theories can account for the variability 
of information activated across both tasks and concepts. However, it is important to note that there 
are weaknesses in this area and both “linguistic information” and “linguistic experience” must be 
better defined. Language can be seen simply as a shortcut to access the simulation system (Barsalou 
et al., 2008), as a way to access meaning through the associations between words (distributional 
views: e.g., Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Lund & Burgess, 1996), or as a way to provide us with 
further computational abilities (Dove, 2014; Clark, 1998). However, language can be all of this, but 
also much more: words are social tools to act in the world, and language is an important embodied 
social experience (Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014), which is likely to possess 
emotional and affective implications (Vigliocco et al., 2014). Language can help us to formulate 
predictions, and contributes to control our behavior (Lupyan & Bergen, 2016; Lupyan & Clark, 
2015) and to improve our thought (Vygotsky, 1986). Language can provide a glue to keep together 
different category members (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014), as well as a means to introspectively 
reason on them (Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005).  
Such a perspective could encourage collaboration between a range of specialties within psychology 
bridging, for example, research from both developmental studies on language acquisition and 
studies on conceptual representation in adults, which have been the main focus of this review. 
Curiously, so far studies on abstract concept acquisition and representation represent two separate 
lines of research (see Granito et al., 2015, for developing this issue). One of the main challenges is 
the attempt to reunify them under a unitary approach. 
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Importantly, the influence of language on concepts can be seen as a powerful mechanism, useful for 
the comprehension of  abstract words of all kinds. In our view the activation of all sorts of linguistic 
information, i.e. of linguistically conveyed information, linguistic form information and syntactic 
linguistic information, becomes more important as the level of abstractness increases. Furthermore, 
from what we have discussed above it should be obvious that the activation of linguistic 
information, is not in contrast with the activation of conceptual content, since the embodied 
approach posits that abstract concepts evoke and re-enact previous experiences. 
Such a mechanism is not linked to a specific content, rather it helps to fill the absence of content. It 
is plausible that the less sensorimotor and affective information is activated, the more language is 
needed, since it can play a scaffolding role to allow the acquisition of abstract words. Importantly, 
this instrument is not simply a means to access meaning, but it brings with it rich individual and 
social experiences. 
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Table caption 
Table 1. The main embodied theories of abstract concepts. As to level of embodiment, we consider 
the following categories: strong embodied views are those that assume that only sensorimotor areas 
are engaged during conceptual processing; weak embodied views are those that assume that both 
sensorimotor and linguistic areas are engaged during conceptual processing; hybrid views assume 
that both embodied and non-embodied representations are activated.  
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 Difference 
between 
abstract 
and 
concrete 
concepts 
Level of 
embodi
ment 
Multiple 
representation 
Role of 
acquisition 
Kind of 
evidence 
Mechanism or 
content? 
Motor theory No: abstract 
= concrete 
concepts 
Strong No: 
sensorimotor  
Unspecified Behavioral 
(ACE effect, 
approach-
avoidance 
effect) 
Mechanism, 
but limited for 
content 
reasons (e.g. to 
transfer 
sentences, or 
to valenced 
stimuli) 
Situation and 
introspective 
view 
Yes: 
abstract 
concepts 
activate 
more social 
aspects of 
situations 
and 
introspectiv
e properties 
Weak Not specified Unspecified Behavioral 
(Feature 
generation) 
M echanism, 
but possible 
content 
limitations 
(e.g. 
introspective 
properties 
mainly 
activated for 
mental state 
concepts) 
Affective 
Embodiment 
Account 
(AEA)  
Yes: 
abstract 
concepts 
activate 
more 
emotions 
Weak Yes: emotional 
and 
sensorimotor; 
also linguistic 
(but not fully 
discussed) 
Emotions as 
bootstrappin
g 
mechanism 
Behavioral 
(Lexical 
decision), 
fMRI, ERPs, 
patients 
Possible 
mechanism, 
but limited for 
content 
reasons (e.g. 
emotional 
properties 
more activated 
for emotional 
concepts) 
Conceptual 
Metaphor 
View (CMT) 
Yes Strong No: 
sensorimotor  
Non 
plausible 
developmen
tal 
trajectory  
Mainly 
behavioral, 
linguistics and 
psychology 
Mechanism, 
but limited due 
to content 
reasons 
Language 
And Situated 
Simulation 
(LASS)  
Yes Weak Yes: 
sensorimotor 
and linguistic 
(language as 
shortcut to 
access meaning) 
Unspecified Behavioral 
(feature 
generation), 
fMRI 
Mainly 
content. 
Mechanism 
related to the 
task, not to the 
kind of 
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concepts. 
Representati
onal 
pluralism: 
Dove 
Yes: 
abstract 
concepts 
activate 
more 
linguistic 
information 
Hybrid Yes: 
sensorimotor 
and linguistic. 
Both modal and 
amodal codes. 
disembodied 
linguistic 
system. 
Unspecified Not direct 
(but indirect 
support from 
evidence 
supporting 
Paivio’s dual 
coding model)  
Mechanism 
Grounding 
and sign 
tracking: 
Prinz 
Yes Weak Yes: multiple 
strategies. Focus 
on 
sensorimotor, 
emotional, 
linguistic 
Unspecified Not direct 
(but indirect 
support from 
evidence on 
all the other 
theories) 
Both content 
and 
mechanism, 
depending on 
the adopted 
strategy 
Words As 
social Tools 
(WAT) 
Yes: 
abstract 
concepts 
activate 
more 
linguistic, 
(emotional) 
and social 
information 
than 
concrete 
ones 
Weak Yes: 
sensorimotor, 
emotional, 
linguistic and 
social 
information 
 
Very 
relevant: 
acquisition 
constrains 
representati
on 
Behavioral 
(e.g. sorting, 
categorization
, feature 
generation), 
fMRI, TMS, 
studies on 
sign 
languages 
Mechanism:, 
not linked to 
the content but 
to the 
abstractness 
level (the more 
abstract 
concepts are, 
the more they 
activate 
linguistic and 
social 
information). 
It is not 
incompatible 
with content 
effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
